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Litigating California Contracts 
 




“Contract interpretation remains the most important 
source of commercial litigation and the most 
contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine 
and scholarship.”1 
 
The centuries have produced a lot of cases on contracts; and even 
more commentary, found in law review articles, casebooks, and the 
like. But there isn’t much on how to apply that material to the trial of 
a contract action.  Trial judges and lawyers are pragmatic souls: We 
just want to know what to do. 
This article was sparked by a couple of cases – one of them mine, 
the other before a colleague with a courtroom down the hall.  Lawyers 
showed up for the first day of trial, ready to pick the jury. There were 
contract causes of action, and the usual collection of associated claims 
and defenses: quantum meruit, accounting, unconscionability, failure 
of consideration, duress, and on. But none of the people in the 
courtrooms, including the judges, knew exactly which issues were for 
the jury, and which for the judge. So jury instructions were 
incomplete; the need for pretrial hearings was unclear; the trial briefs 
were, to put it kindly, insufficient.  As I came to appreciate more fully 
after I drafted the note that follows here, the time to figure these 
issues was long past; but having been handed the cases on the 
appointed day of trial, I on my case, and my colleague on his, dug in. 
It would be a very long time before we were able to start picking 
a jury. 
Most contracts cases look simple: assemble a jury, tell it to decide 
if there’s a breach, and assess damages. Some cases are simple, at least 
legally, because for example there’s no disagreement on what the 
 
* Judge of the California Superior Court (County of San Francisco). 
 1. Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation As Contract Design, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 23 (2014). 
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contract is or what it means. But high complexity can lurk behind 
everything from an unlawful detainer case to a multi-billion-dollar 
commercial dispute. This complexity is often a function of problems 
of scope—what constitutes the deal?—and meaning.  This note is 
designed to walk through the practical application of law to the 
determination of those two core issues. This implicates the respective 
provinces of the judge and jury, and it turns out that many contract 
cases require an analysis of those provinces across a wide variety of 
claims and defenses. If the trial is not carefully planned, chaos will 
erupt as issues about to go to the jury need a judge to decide some 
preliminary matter, or as a judge is about to decide something, she 
realizes at the last moment that, first, the jury has to hear evidence, be 
instructed, and deliberate.  In worst-case scenarios this happens 
repeatedly.  So, this note also includes sections on jury rights 
generally, waiver, and short discussions of the right as it might apply 
to a series of claims and defenses often encountered in cases with a 
contract cause of action. 
Section 1 of this Note begins with a short historical view of 
contract.  While this is a relatively academic review, the point is to 
provide background to allow for a critical assessment of the disparate 
appellate authorities which are lobbed at the trial judge, usually out 
of context. Section 1 also helps with an assessment of the historical 
test used in California to decide if a claim has a right to a jury 
determination.  The test is arbitrary, at least in the sense that the 
considerations one might have for wanting a jury versus a judge, or 
vice versa (such as relief from oppression and partisan judges, 
trusting in Jacksonian democracy, ability to appeal to the common 
person or stir indignation, the injection of equitable fairness, 
management of complex legal and factual issues, whether policy 
issues are in play, a felt need for objective rules which function well 
as precedent, and so on and so forth), don’t distinguish between 
claims which are, and which are not, subject to a jury trial under the 
classic historical test.2  A variant of the test, as we’ll see, may  indeed 
attend to these considerations.)  But trial judges and lawyers might 
not care much: we just want to know what the rules are, and how to 
implement them. That’s the subject of Section 2 of this Note. 
 
II. HISTORICAL NOTES ON CONTRACT LAW 
 
 2. E.g., Fleming James, Jr., Right to A Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 661 
(1963). 
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“But before you have crossed the range you have seen 
rock of such varied type, age, and provenance that 
time itself becomes nervous—Pliocene, Miocene, 
Eocene nonmarine, Jurassic here, Triassic there, 
Ypresian, Lutetian, Tithonian, Rhaetian, Messinian, 
Maastrichtian, Valanginian, Kimmeridgian, upper 
Paleozoic . . . a collection of relics from varied ages and 
many ancestral landscapes, transported from afar or 
near, set beside or upon one another. . ..”3 
 
Providing a history of contract is, to put it as mildly as I can, 
beyond my powers, and it would be gratuitous in light of the work of 
others who have spent their professional careers on it.  But it is useful 
to provide a rough timeline of events, to inform the discussions that 
follow on how to handle contract cases, including how to decide 
which claims, such as contract, have a right to a jury, and which 
claims do not, and what evidence to admit for which purposes. The 
timeline also helps to understand appellate opinions which seem to 
rest on their views of the history of contract.  These opinions often 
present contract law as a set of consistent principles, perhaps 
mutating through time, but arriving now at our doorstep as an 
integrated whole.  But the sources of law include current case law, 
statutes, and earlier opinions and commentators.  Their substances 
are wildly disparate, but all are cited with equal authority in latter 
day opinions. 
Actually, what counts as a ‘contract’ has shifted over time: it’s bit 
like tracing back the human species- how far do we go? To Homo 
habilis? Homo erectus? Chimpanzees? One goes back until one finds 
the essential indicia of contract.  People have differed on what those 
essential indicia are.  If it’s consideration, that’s one thing; if it’s the 
recognition of the executory agreement, that’s another. If it’s mutual 
intent, that’s a different moment in time.4  Grant Gilmore tells us 
contract law didn’t erupt until the last decades of the nineteenth 
century when Harvard’s Professor Langdell devised casebooks to 
 
 3. JOHN MCPHEE, ASSEMBLING CALIFORNIA, 21-22 (1993) (describing California’s 
Sierra Nevada including Franciscan mélange). 
 4. See generally D. J. Boorstin, Tradition and Method in Legal History, 54 HARV. L. REV. 
424, 431 (1941). 
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teach law,5 with an assist from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.6  Others go 
back to assumpsit; actually, Holmes does, which is a lot further back.7 
As judges invoke the past to support their opinions today, they 
resort to different pasts. The law today seems more like the 
Franciscan mélange, a jumble of rocks and soils from many different 
periods. So much to choose from.  The truth is that that contract cases 
involve many competing interests and principles from disparate 
pasts.  Indeed, we laud greats like Benjamin Cardozo for 
“harmonizing the many contending concerns of contract law, 
including commercial certainty, freedom of contract, good faith, 
protecting the reasonable expectations of parties, and forfending 
interparty exploitation.”8 
But for those of us—trial judges and lawyers—reading opinions 
to figure out what to do in the present case, this can be nerve-
wracking.  We read to extract a guiding thread, to apply it to our new 
facts.  Speaking for myself, I need to know when and if to admit 
evidence, and the tectonic shifts in contract doctrine have had very 
different answers to that elemental question. A little history might 
help extract a guiding thread from opinions which present all threads 
as equally operative. 
My core sources are three items by Morton J. Horwitz, his “The 
Historical Foundations Of Modern Contract Law,” 87 HARV. L. REV. 
917 (1974) which he developed and included in his book, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977) (abbreviated 
to “T1” here) and THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960 (1992) (abbreviated to “T2” here). Even where I don’t expressly 
note Professor Horwitz, the discussion is usually based on his work. 
Horwitz has his critics,9 but generally I won’t rely on the contested 
bits of his analyses. 
 
 5. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).  Langdell’s casebook first 
came out in 1871.  See generally Todd Rakoff, Case Method, Campus & Community (Oct. 12, 
2011), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2011/10/case-method/.  See Morton J. 
Horwitz, Review of Gilmore’s Death of Contract, 42 UNIV CHI. L. REV. 787 (1975). 
 6. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). 
 7. Holmes tell us that the whole “modern law of contract has grown up through the 
medium of the action of Assumpsit,” which dates to the “reign of Edward III,” Id. at 275, 
which is to say 1312-1377. 
 8. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1379, 1381 (1995). 
 9. E.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts, 46 UNIV. CHI. 
L. REV. 533, 535 (1979).  Horwitz, Gilmore, and others are taken to taken to task by e.g., 
Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 
 
2021 LITIGATING CALIFORNIA CONTRACTS  169 
 
2.1 BROAD STROKES 
 
There are two major movements over the last few centuries in 
contract law featured in this review.  They are connected, but not 
always in the same way. The first has to do with the essential nature 
of a contract, the second relates to what we are allowed to look at as 
we decide a contract’s meaning; i.e., admissibility. The first 
movement is the shift from an equitable view of contract—enforcing 
what’s fair—to the “will” theory in which the parties’ intent is the 
essence of the deal, to the “objective” theory which says the contract 
is the words (usually written) adopted by the parties, sometimes also 
including other ‘objective’ indicia.  The second movement is from 
textualism—admitting only the words as evidence of what the deal 
requires, “the plain meaning of the language contained within the 
four corners of the contract”10—to contextualism, in which smaller or 
greater segments of the real-world context of the agreement are 
admitted to explain its meaning. 
These movements are not one-way; they continue to shift, back 
and forth, to this day.  We’re in the midst of the objective era, but with 
doctrines of unconscionability and others, old equity remains firmly 
in play.11 We’re also—somewhat—in the midst of a contextualist era, 
where sometimes the context of the agreement matters to its 
interpretation. Today, at some points in contract analysis, we care 
about parties’ expressions of intent; and at other points, we don’t, at 
all. 
Well-known names associated with these movements are 
Samuel Williston, a textualist, plain meaning fellow, and Arthur 
Corbin, who “sharply criticized” Williston’s approach12 and argued 
for a broader review of the circumstances of the contract. In addition 
 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 (2000).  See also Robert W. Gordon, Morton Horwitz and His 
Critics: A Conflict of Narratives, 37 TULSA L. REV. 915, 918 (2002). 
 10. Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on the Interpretation 
of Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 520 (2017). 
 11. E.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded 
Influences into A Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law It Is by Or Actions in Dealings 
That We Become Either Just or Unjust, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 897–98 (1999). 
 12. Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its 
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 196–97 (1998). 
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to Holmes, we will also meet Benjamin Cardozo, allied with Corbin, 
and a “dedicated contextualist.”13 
 
2.2  TIMELINE 
 
Holmes’ THE COMMON LAW takes us back to the twelfth century, 
the reign of King Henry II [1133-1189]. You may recall Henry married 
Eleanor, Duchess of Aquitaine, both portrayed in James Goldman’s 
1966 play The Lion in Winter, and made into a terrific film. Holmes tell 
us that “great changes were beginning in the reign of Henry II. More 
various and complex contracts soon came to be enforced.”14 There 
was no trial by jury at this point,15 so the problem of allocation of 
issues among judge and jury had not yet been raised. The “most 
simple contracts and debts for which there was not the evidence of 
deed or witness were left to be enforced by the ecclesiastical courts.” 
Holmes then says “the whole modern law of contract has grown up 
through the medium of the action of Assumpsit,” to the “reign of 
Edward III [1312-1377].”16 (Assumpsit is an old form of contract: 
translated as “he undertook” or “he promised,” and abolished in 
England in the nineteenth century.17) 
Leaping ahead, we come to the 1700s and the equitable approach 
(or doctrine). Damages for breach were set as what was fair; not 
necessarily what the parties had bargained for. If a defendant had 
paid little in the bargain, the plaintiff’s damages would be reduced to 
be ‘fair’ approximation of what had been paid. Deals were by 
definition ‘fair’ exchanges. Plaintiffs suing for damages had to 
confront the notion of a customary price, and a bargain in excess of 
that was unlikely to be enforced; it wasn’t fair and equitable.  Specific 
performance was available; perhaps made the more attractive 
because, in the absence of sophisticated markets, goods were not 
fungible. Contracts were seen as transferring title: I agreed to give 
you one pig and you agreed to give me a peck of wheat. The court 
might order enforcement of the contract and tell you to give me the 
wheat, but only because you were holding my property. 
 
 13. Meredith R. Miller, One Judge’s Legacy and the New York Court of Appeals: Mr. Justice 
Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 34 TOURO L. REV. 263 (2018). 
 14. O. W. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 261. 
 15. Id. at 255. 
 16. Id. at 274-75. 
 17. BRYAN GARNER, GARNER DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE, 87 (2011). 
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By the late 1700s, contract law moved away from its reliance on 
property law, and some understood a contract as creating an 
expectation of a future benefit.  No longer did an agreement only 
create an immediate transfer of title.  Now contracts could be used to 
protect against fluctuations in market prices and market availability 
of products.  It is this ability to contract for future benefit—and the 
related recognition of executory contracts, with performance due in 
the future—that may be seen as the hallmark of the modern contract.18 
In 1790, John Joseph Powell published in London his ESSAY 
UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS.  Earlier 
enforcement of ‘fair’ and customary bargains had been seen as 
providing stability in the sense of an enforcement of prevailing and 
discernable, objective, values.  But Powell denounced the equitable 
doctrine as destabilizing, undermining the rule of law.  He wrote, as 
Horwitz notes: 
 
“[I]t is absolutely necessary for the advantage of 
the public at large,” Powell wrote, “that the rights of 
the subject should . . . depend upon certain and fixed 
principles of law, and not upon rules and 
constructions of equity, which when applied . . ., must 
be arbitrary and uncertain, depending, in the extent of 
their application, upon the will and caprice of the 
judge.” The reason why equity “must be arbitrary and 
uncertain,” Powell maintained, was that there could 
be no principles of substantive justice. A court of 
equity, for example, should not be permitted to refuse 
to enforce an agreement for simple “exorbitancy of 
price” because “it is the consent of parties alone, that 
fixes the just price of any thing, without reference to 
the nature of things themselves, or to their intrinsic 
value . . .. [T]herefore,” he concluded, “a man is 
 
 18. Judge Posner writes, “Were exchange simultaneous and limited to goods the 
quality of which was obvious on inspection, so that there was no danger of unwanted 
surprises, there would be little need either for contracts or for legal remedies for breach of 
contract. The main purpose of contracts is to enable performance to unfold over time 
without either party being at the mercy of the other, as would be the case if, for example, 
a buyer could refuse to pay for a custom-built house for which there were no alternative 
buyers at or above the agreed price.”  R. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract 
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obliged in conscience to perform a contract which he 
has entered into, although it be a hard one . . ..”19 
 
After the American Revolution, more sophisticated markets had 
been formed, goods seen increasingly as fungible, executory contracts 
(with performance in the future) were more routinely made, and the 
“value” of consideration was increasingly not a function of 
ascertainable, customary, objective value, but instead the function of 
the parties’ desires and intentions. Whether or not a peck of wheat 
was “worth” one pig, if you and I agreed that a peck of wheat was 
worth a pig, the courts should enforce our deal.  Powell announced 
the “will” theory of contract: courts should carry out the intentions of 
the parties—even if it resulted in a “hard” bargain. 
In 1791, a year after Powell’s ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS, the Seventh Amendment was 
enacted. It is as of this moment that federal courts decide whether a 
cause of action is entitled to a jury: if it did in 1791, it does now.20  
California’s historical cutoff date wouldn’t be for another 59 years. 
The presumption of a stable customary measure of contract 
value continued to erode as the eighteenth century came to a close. In 
lawsuits complaining that stock was not delivered, expectation 
damages were awarded—the value of the stock as it turned out to be, 
or as expected to be, not its value when it had been promised. This 
allowance of expectation damages continued into the early 1800s, 
recognizing the bases of these commercial deals.21 Courts identified 
and enforced the mutual “subjective meaning which parties actually 
attributed to contractual language.”22  By 1824, the New York case of 
Seymour v. Delancy23 shows the courts refusing to consider whether 
consideration for an exchange is “fair” or not.  The earlier role of the 
 
 19. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 917–18 (1974) (notes omitted). 
 20. E.g., Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 424 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Havlish v. 650 Fifth Ave. Co., 934 F.3d 174, 184 n.11 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 21. Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of 
Satisfaction”-A Nonunified Theory, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 388 (1995) (noting Gulian 
Verplanck’s 1825 work, An Essay on the Doctrine of Contracts, as an important moment in 
“adapting contract law to the realities of a market economy”). 
 22. Jiri Janko, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: Incorporating Semiotic 
Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 601 (2007).  “Modern 
contract law arose early in the nineteenth century to combat existing ‘just price’ theories 
of value.” Horwitz, Review of Gilmore’s Death of Contract, supra note 5, at 794). By ‘modern 
contract law’ Horwitz means the will theory. Id. at 795. 
 23. Seymour v. Delancy, 1824 WL 2270 (N.Y. 1824). 
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courts in regulating agreements through equity continued to be 
eviscerated through the nineteenth century. The intent—the will—of 
the parties defined the agreement. 
In 1828, the emerging will theory of contractual obligation was 
not yet complete. But it was by 1844. Horwitz points to Story’s Treatise 
on the Law of Contract (“Every contract,” he wrote, “is founded upon 
the mutual agreement of the parties . . . Both express and implied 
contracts were “equally founded upon the actual agreement of the 
parties, and the only distinction between them is in regard to the 
mode of proof, and belongs to the law of evidence.”).24 This is where 
we get our “meeting of the minds” test.  Under will theory, “the 
extent of contractual obligation depends upon the convergence of 
individual desires.”25 
But it became increasingly clear that the commercial interests in 
stability and predictability of contract were not well-served by the 
will theory, with the concomitant ability of the parties at trial to plead, 
for example, different meanings of the contract depending on usage 
and custom.  Joseph Story himself in 1837, before his 1844 Treatise 
came out, sounded an alarm.26 
In 1850, California joins the Union. It had, the year before, 
enacted a Constitution, which went into effect on the date of 
admission, September 9, 1850.27 California preserves the right to a 
jury as it existed in 1850.  But coincidentally, it is a pivotal moment in 
the history of contract. So, it is not clear what is being preserved. 
In 1855, 11 years after Story’s Treatise, and five years after the 
magical date of 1850, Theophilus Parsons in his LAW OF CONTRACTS 
echoes Joseph Story’s alarm, expressing great dismay at the impact of 
will theory: it too cannot ensure predictability, a sine qua non for 
commercial interests. Perhaps more importantly, he says that the 
construction and interpretation of contracts is not a matter of fact of 
juries.  It is for judges.28  The development of the objective doctrine, 
overtaking the will doctrine, took place in “the second half of the 
[nineteenth] century . . . converting questions of “fact” into questions 
 
 24. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 185 
(1979). 
 25. Horwitz, supra note 19, at 927. 
 26. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 196. 
 27. 1849 California Constitution Fact Sheet, 
https://www.sos.ca.gov/archives/collections/constitutions/1849-constitution-facts/. 
 28. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 197. 
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of “law” [and so] effected a shift of power from juries to courts.”29 In 
1857, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected parol evidence in light of a 
written contract, although it conceded the plaintiff was illiterate.30 
This objective theory and its reliance on juries came to dominate 
American law,31 but only after California became a state.  Holmes 
recited the doctrine in 1881, in THE COMMON LAW: “The law has 
nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’ minds. In contract, 
as elsewhere, it must go by externals, and judge parties by their 
conduct.”  It was stated by Learned Hand this way: 
 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with 
the personal, or individual, intent of the parties. A 
contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of 
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which 
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. 
If, however, it were proved by twenty bishops that 
either party, when he used the words, intended 
something else than the usual meaning which the law 
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless 
there were some mutual mistake, or something else of 
the sort.32 
 
In 1872,  just under 20 years after Parsons’ LAW OF CONTRACTS, 
the California legislature enacts most of the current set of statutes on 
contract. This was a momentous year: California passed a variant of 
New York’s Field Code, including the “new Civil, Criminal, and 
Political Codes.”33  Most of the California statutes on contracts were 
enacted in 1872.  The provisions are heavy on the intent of the parties, 
i.e., will theory, e.g. CC §§ 1636, 1639, 1640, 1643, 1648, 1649, 1653; 
CCP §§ 1859, 1860. (But not every one: a couple target the words of 
 
 29. Morton J. Horwitz, “Review” of Gilmore’s Death of Contract, 42 UNIV CHI. L. REV. 
787, 795 (1975).  One of Horwitz’s critics too notes the “progressive dethronement of the 
jury” during the nineteenth century.  A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History 
of Contracts, 46 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 533, 600 (1979). 
 30. Selden v. Myers, 61 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1857). 
 31. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 48-49 
(1994). 
 32. Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of N.Y, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), discussed 
in Daniel P. O’Gorman, Learned Hand and the Objective Theory of Contract Interpretation, 18 
U.N.H. L. REV. 63 (2019).   See generally Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1123–24 (2008). 
 33. Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617 
(1994). 
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the agreement, such as CC §§ 1638, some of 1639; 1641,34 perhaps a 
reflection of the shifting sands favoring objectivism. 
Chronologically, this is where we come across Holmes’ assault 
on the will theory, in his 1881 THE COMMON LAW.  Eight years later 
he comes out with “The Theory of Legal Interpretation,”35 which 
pursues this assault, pressing the objective theory: “For each party to 
a contract has notice that the other will understand his words 
according to the usage of the normal speaker of English under the 
circumstances, and therefore cannot complain if his words are taken 
in that sense.”36 
By 1920, objectivist Samuel Williston is looking back, maybe re-
writing history a bit. “It was long ago settled,” he says, that “secret 
intent was immaterial, only overt acts being considered” to 
understand the meaning of a contract.37 His followers say the will 
theory, the examination of intent, was an “alien” theory.38  It was 
nonsense to talk about the “meeting of the minds.”  But it wasn’t 
nonsense and it wasn’t alien in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
as Williston’s treatise noted:39 It had been very much a domestic 
product, brought about by the ancestors of the same commercial 
interests which now had delivered the “revolution”40 of objective 
theory.41  Williston did not want to see extrinsic evidence admitted to 
change the meaning of the agreement’s words. His brand of 
objectivism, unlike that others we’ll see next, severely limited parol 
evidence.42 
 
 34. Also, in 1872 the Legislature enacted the “Maximums of Jurisprudence” which 
some contract opinions have cited.  Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3509 ff. (four maxims were added 
later).  Among these of possible interest for contract interpretation: clean hands, § 3517; a 
form of in pari delicto, § 3524; laches § 3527; specific term controls the general, § 3534; 
preferred interpretations (not to read provision as void), § 3541; and interpretation, § 3542. 
 35. O. W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899). 
 36. Id. at 419. 
 37. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 200; SAMUEL WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS (1920). 
 38. See Williston, supra note 37. 
 39. “During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, there were many 
expressions which seemed to indicate a contrary rule. Chief among these was the familiar 
statement, still invoked by many courts today, that a contract requires a ‘meeting of the 
minds’ of the parties.”  1 Williston on Contracts § 4:1 (4th ed.) (notes omitted). 
 40. Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its 
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 199–200 (1998). 
 41. HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 201. 
 42. E.g., Michael L. Boyer, Contract as Text: Interpretive Overlap in Law and Literature, 
12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 168 n.3 (2003). 
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During this same period, i.e., after the turn of the century, 
another debate was afoot, this one focusing on what evidence might 
be considered in the integration of a contract, closely related to the 
battle between the will and objective doctrines. This other contest was 
between the contextualists and the textualists (adherents of ‘plain 
meaning’). The textualism plain meaning approach is associated with 
the “late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,” and the 
“modern” contextualist approach with the mid-twentieth century.43 
Cardozo is the great expounder of contextualism, denigrating 
the textualist reliance on the words, and only the words, of the 
contract: “[t]he law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism 
when the precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip 
was fatal.”44  Note, though, that this generous consideration of 
surrounding circumstances was still an objectivist reading, still 
declining to rely on actual intent of the parties; it was just that the 
objective facts from which one would glean contract meaning 
included more than words.45 
The contextualist approach however did not necessarily lead to 
a more predicable outcome or, thus, more stability in economic 
relations.  In pursuit of outcomes which accorded with the 
practicalities of the situation—at least as seen by a judge such as 
Cardozo—the law was perhaps more “wavering and blurred.”46 
Indeed, opting for the practicality of contextualism was in a way a 
shift—a shift back, we might say—to “equity and fairness.”47 That is, 
the pragmatic insistence on courts doing what seems economically 
reasonable, and finding that the parties’ true agreement was one 
based on economic practicality, ironically would reduce certainty in 
economic life, and, it seems to me, reinvigorate the equitable theories 
 
 43. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).  See, Joshua M. 
Silverstein, Contract Interpretation Enforcement Costs: An Empirical Study of Textualism 
Versus Contextualism Conducted Via the West Key Number System, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1011, 
1058 (2019), noting Justice Traynor’s decision Pacific Gas v. G.W. Thomas Drayage Co., as the 
paradigmatic example of contextualism.  I mention this case below in the text. 
 44. Meredith R. Miller, One Judge’s Legacy and the New York Court of Appeals: Mr. Justice 
Cardozo and the Law of Contracts, 34 TOURO L. REV. 263 (2018) (“Cardozo was a dedicated 
contextualist”). 
 45. Larry A. DiMatteo, Cardozo, Anti-Formalism, and the Fiction of Noninterventionism, 
28 PACE L. REV. 315, 340–41 (2008).  Holmes, a founding father of objectivism, too of course 
is closely associated with the pragmatic approach.  Morton J. Horwitz, Review of Gilmore’s 
Death of Contract, 42 UNIV CHI. L. REV. 787, 796 (1975). 
 46. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) (Cardozo 
majority opinion). 
 47. Id.; see also, Jacob & Youngs, discussed in, RICHARD POSNER, A STUDY IN REPUTATION 
92, 105-06 (1990). 
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which predated the will doctrine. Cardozo bent law to the realities of 
the marketplace and the real-life customs of the parties (into line with 
“commercial necessity”48).  But this reinvigorated reliance on the 
unique conditions of every deal, perhaps reduced predictability.49 
Cardozo’s objectivism was not the objectivism of a plain 
meaning reliance on the written words. For Justice’s McLaughlin’s 
dissent in Jacob & Youngs, the issue was clear: the literal words of the 
contract were concededly breached, and the “trial court was right in 
directing a verdict for the defendant.”50 This was the plain meaning 
of the deal. But this was endorsed by only three of the seven members 
of the court. 
In 1925, Karl Llewellyn amplified the pragmatic, contextualist 
approach,51 to be followed by his writings in the early 1930s which 
continued to press for changes in contract law and in particular in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) which accorded with changing 
economic realities.52  The 1940s saw an increasing shift toward 
contextualism in the UCC, where for Llewellyn the words were only 
a piece of the spectrum of objective fact to be considered. This tended 
to displace Williston’s static “plain meaning” model of 
interpretation.53 But an important underlying rationale for 
 
 48. Posner, supra note 47, at 97. 
 49. “Although much academic commentary suggests otherwise, both the available 
evidence and prevailing judicial practice support the claim that sophisticated parties 
prefer textualist interpretation.  Sophisticated commercial parties incur costs to cast 
obligations expressly in written and unconditional forms to permit a party to stand on its 
rights under the written contract, to improve party incentives to invest in the deal, and to 
reduce litigation costs.  Contextualist courts and commentators prefer to withdraw from 
parties the ability to use these instruments for contract design.  The contextualists, 
however, cannot justify rules that so significantly restrict contractual freedom in the name 
of contractual freedom.”  Alan Schwartz, Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 
YALE L.J. 926 (2010).  However, not all parties are sophisticated, and especially in the 
context of one-to-many consumer contracts (discussed in Section 3), most contracts of 
employment, and other contracts of adhesion, there may be little or no costs incurred in 
negotiating or drafting form agreements. 
 50. Jacob & Youngs, 230 N.Y. 239, 246, 129 N.E. 889, 892. 
 51. Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 
665 (1925), discussed in N.E.H. Hull, Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence: A 
Prequel to The Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1302, 1311 (1989). 
 52. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 
(1931).  See also KARL N. LLEWLLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALEs (1930), 
discussed in John B. Clutterbuck, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise 
Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1134–35 (1988). 
 53. E.g., Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary 
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 
169, 187 (1989).  See generally John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of 
Llewellyn, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 263, 294 (2000). 
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contextualism was still that the greater span of admissible objective 
facts, such as “trade usage, custom, and commercial practice in 
contract interpretation provided external and objective measures of 
meaning.”54 
During this period, one of Llewellyn’s teachers, Arthur Corbin, 
too was aiming at the heart of Willistonian emphasis on the branch of 
objectivism that excluded much extrinsic evidence. Horwitz places 
Corbin’s impact starting with influential articles in 1912 and 1918.55 
“Corbin’s view that extrinsic evidence reduces the influence of a 
judge’s personal biases, and thus results in a more accurate 
interpretation of the words written by the drafters, has been widely 
accepted in contract law. Both the UCC and the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts reflect that view.”56  The “battle between the titans of 
contract, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin . . . [continue] to the 
present . . . In a textualist regime, generalist courts cannot choose to 
consider context; in a contextualist regime, these courts must consider 
it. Thus, text or context.”57 
The march towards contextualism in California culminated in 
what we might see as a founding document of California’s law on 
contracts, Justice Traynor’s decision in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,58 a rejection of the plain meaning rule.59  
The contract’s meaning “can only be found by interpretation of all the 
circumstances that reveal the sense in which the writer used the 
 
 54. Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Interpretation in the Realm of Idealism, 5 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 17, 29 (2006). 
 55. HORWITZ, supra note 31, at 49. 
 56. Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its 
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195, 197–98 (1998) (note 
omitted); see Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parole Evidence Rule, 
50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 164 (1965); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 555 at 239 
(1960) (“[s]eldom should the court hold that the written words exclude evidence of the 
custom, since even what are often called ‘plain’ meanings are shown to be incorrect when 
all the circumstances of the transaction are known ....”), discussed at e.g., Craig A. Naird, A 
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 82 (2000). See also e.g., Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but Best-Tool-for-the-Job, 85 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1625, 1628–29 (2017). 
 57. Ronald J. Gilson, et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 
100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2014). 
 58. Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W Thomas Drayage etc. Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33 (1968).  See 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Contract Interpretation 2.0: Not Winner-Take-All but Best-Tool-
for-the-Job, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1625, 1628–29 (2017). 
 59. E.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397, 470 (2004); Carlton J. Snow, Contract Interpretation: The Plain 
Meaning Rule in Labor Arbitration, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 690 (1987); Robert W. Emerson, 
Franchising and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 659, 675 (2013). 
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words.”60 The impact of this case, and its distance from the plain 
meaning rule, can be seen in Justice Baxter’s concurrence a generation 
later: 
 
However, I cannot join the majority’s general 
endorsement of Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G.W. Thomas 
Drayage etc. Co. . . . Pacific Gas essentially abrogated the 
traditional rule that parol evidence is not admissible to 
contradict the plain meaning of an integrated 
agreement by concluding that, even if the agreement 
“appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous on 
its face,” extrinsic evidence is admissible to expose a 
latent ambiguity, i.e., the possibility that the parties 
actually intended the language to mean something 
different. (Id. at p. 37, 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641.) 
[¶] Read in its broadest sense, Pacific Gas thus 
stretched the unremarkable principle that extrinsic 
evidence is admissible to resolve a contractual 
ambiguity into a rule that parol evidence is always 
admissible to demonstrate ambiguity despite facial 
clarity. The effect is that, despite their best efforts to 
produce a clear written agreement, parties can never 
confidently conduct their affairs on the basis of the 
language they have drafted. 
 
Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 384, 395 (2006) (Baxter, J., 




 60. 69 Cal. 2d at 38. 
 61. Justice Baxter recalls Judge Kozinski’s classic attack on Pacific Gas: “Under Pacific 
Gas, it matters not how clearly a contract is written, nor how completely it is integrated, 
nor how carefully it is negotiated, nor how squarely it addresses the issue before the court: 
the contract cannot be rendered impervious to attack by parol evidence.  If one side is 
willing to claim that the parties intended one thing but the agreement provides for 
another, the court must consider extrinsic evidence of possible ambiguity.  If that evidence 
raises the specter of ambiguity where there was none before, the contract language is 
displaced and the intention of the parties must be divined from self-serving testimony 
offered by partisan witnesses whose recollection is hazy from passage of time and colored 
by their conflicting interests.”  Trident Ctr. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 
569 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 62. E.g., Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Grp. Staffing Co., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 5th 670, 2020 
WL 5525180, at *8 (Sept. 15, 2020). 
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There are a few notions we can extract from this brief history. 
First, some humility.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to know 
what the law “is” at any moment in history.  Law changes over time, 
and most of the shifts outlined above took decades. Yet both federal 
and California law depends on that conceit to decide which causes of 
actions are entitled to a jury, an issue explored in detail in Section 2 
of this note.  Reporting Cardozo’s views, Corbin noted, “All ‘rules of 
law’ are aggregations of words, with fringes of uncertainty and 
variable content.”63  Our backward view, back to 1791 or 1850 for 
example, cannot be more precise.64 
As of the magic dates of 1791 or 1850, the same issue might be 
treated as equitable and as legal, for the judge and for the jury.65  
Sometimes, the historical approach—the effort to determine what 
was then for the judge and what was for the jury—simply misses 
entire chapters of history.66 
And doctrines fold and unfold through time: they mutate and 
return through the back door.  For example, recall the assortment of 
issues thought of as ‘equitable’ in the 1700s—the notion that unfair 
contracts will not be enforced, or, more perhaps accurately, that they 
will be enforced only to the extent they are fair.  This has been 
resurrected in the form of unconscionability and other doctrines.  
Current defenses like misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, 
mistake, frustration, and others focus on “substantive fairness in 
exchange.”67 Referring to this quiet reinvigoration of equitable 
theories, professor DiMatteo writes “This covert operation was made 
 
 63. Arthur L. Corbin, The Judicial Process Revisited: Introduction, 71 YALE L.J. 195, 199 
(1961). 
 64. There is also the more abstract problem that appellate opinions on contract, the 
prime source for determining the progress and shifts in the law, don’t necessarily corelate 
to contract practice among people and businesses; they only corelate to the contracts that 
end up in court.  Our view of what contract “is” is like that of an emergency room doctor 
who thinks the practice of medicine is just trauma work: for that doctor, medicine is taking 
care of the crises.  The “common kinds of appellate cases are: atypical or freak business 
transactions; economically marginal deals both in terms of the type of transaction and 
amounts involved; high-stake, zero-sum speculations; deals where there is an outsider 
interest that does not allow compromise; and family economic transactions.”  Friedman 
& Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present and Future, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 
805, 817 (1967). 
 65. Fleming James, Jr., Right to A Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 664 (1963). 
 66. Jay Tidmarsh, The English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1902 (2016). 
 67. P.S. Atiyah, Contract and Fair Exchange, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 2 (1985). 
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necessary by the triumph of the “will theory” over the substantive 
fairness or equitable contract theory of the eighteenth century . . .”68 
We recall Powell’s 1790 pronouncement that under the now 
eclipsed “will” theory of contract, courts must enforce the intentions 
of the parties—even if it resulted in a “hard” bargain; today it is still 
true that “unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple 
old-fashioned bad bargain.’”69 
Secondly, the labels we use to fix the law—as we might say, ‘the 
objectivist theory was in force’—mean different things to different 
people. And there are entirely legitimate debates about the statement 
of law attributed to those we use to mark the law’s instantiation: we 
say “Willistonian,” for example, meaning a formalistic four-corners 
analysis, but there’s disagreement about what Williston was stating,70 
and so perhaps what the law was when he stated it, or where the law 
went under his influence.  Sometimes, cases and commentators may 
take a look at a doctrine, and wrongly summarize it, and then we are 
misled into thinking a related doctrine was in play. For example, a 
current commentator writes “The objective approach to contract 
interpretation is known as the ‘plain meaning’ rule, also the ‘four 
corners’ rule, which expects courts to eschew extrinsic evidence of 
meaning if they find contract language to be plain, clear and 
unambiguous.”71 But our historical review has shown that 
objectivism means setting aside an investigation of intent, or 
“meeting of the minds,” and that some—but not all—adherents 
would also fall into the “plain meaning” textualist camp. 
Related to this is the fact that when we say, for example, that 
contract was a jury issue in 1791, or 1850, we mingle aspects of the 
cause of action which were probably subject to different treatment at 
different times.  Breach and (within limits) damages may well have 
generally been issues for the jury, but over time there were differing 
approaches to meaning and interpretation, with less of a role for the 
jury as objectivism took hold, and as a function of textualism; and 
 
 68. Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded 
Influences into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 839, 897–
98 (1999).  See also e.g., Charles Fried, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 93 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1858, 1862 (1980) (Reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF 
CONTRACT, Oxford University Press (1985). 
 69. OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho, 8 Cal.5th 111, 130 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). 
 70. E.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 275 
(2005). 
 71. 1A PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:34 (as of January 2020 update). 
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more of a role as contextualism came into vogue.  And it is in just 
those areas- integration, meaning and the use of extrinsic evidence—
that current law is the most complex, reflecting the persistence, like 
Jurassic, Ypresian, and Lutetian rock in the today’s Sierra Nevada 
mountain range, of overlapping and incongruous doctrines. 
One reasonable overview of the shifts mapped out above posits 
little jury input into contract resolution during the ‘equitable’ era, 
relatively far more during the ‘will’ era, a consolidation of more 
control by judges during the textualist period, and an expansion of 
the jury’s role during the contextualist period. The 1850 marker in 
California law, the moment by which we decide what is for the jury 
and what for the judge, comes in the midst of one such evolution, 
from will to objectivism. 
Another version of this problem is posed by California’s 1872 
statutes, which, at least in great part, embodied the will theory.72 The 
difficulty is of course is that while the will theory disappeared, the 
statutes didn’t, and it is elementary that courts have to follow statute 
law.  So it is today that we have a plethora of opinions which pay 
nominal obeisance to the “meeting of the minds” language.73  There 
is a way to deal with this, which is to obliterate the statutes. Here’s 
how you do it: quote the statutes; say that mutual assent or intent is 
required for a contract and allude to the ‘meeting of the minds’ test; 
then qualify that to objectively perceptible evidence of intent, i.e. the 
words of the parties, then focus on the words to deduce the meaning 
of the contract.74 As I have suggested elsewhere, “intent” becomes a 
disposable legal fiction.75  This tactic has a most venerable history: it’s 
just one the ways in which the objective theory, as opposed to the will 
 
 72. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1636–37, 1639–40, 1643–44, 1648–49, 1653. 
 73. E.g., “Every contract requires mutual assent or consent (Civ. Code, §§ 1550, 1565) 
….” Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Engineering, Inc., 89 Cal. 
App.4th 1042, 1049 (2001).  The phrase “meeting of the minds” appears in 628 published 
and unpublished cases from 1990 to 2020, albeit in a wide variety of contexts, and in the 
relatively recent unpublished case Polycomp Tr. Co. v. Agbede, 2020 WL 3168537, at *5 (June 
15, 2020).  Deliciously, Polycomp cites in support a 1919 case, California Packing Corp. v. 
Emirzian, 45 Cal. App. 236, 240 (1919), obviously decided before the will theory had been 
demoted. 
 74. E.g., Rodriguez v. Oto, 212 Cal. App. 4th 1020, 1027 (2013). 
 75. Curtis E.A. Karnow, Dangerous Fictions, THE DAILY JOURNAL (May 22, 2020), 
https://works.bepress.com/curtis_karnow/44/.  As befits a doctrine with a twisted 
history, the actual test is more complex, as we will see in Section 2 of this note: the objective 
meaning of words controls, unless a judge thinks there’s ambiguity and there is extrinsic 
evidence which generates a meaning to which the words are reasonably susceptible, in 
which case the meaning is other than might appear via the words, but even then the only 
extrinsic evidence which is considered is “objective” like words, actions and usage. 
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theory, is articulated.76 It co-opts the language of will theory, falsely 
suggesting no more than elaboration; it is the installation of a 
Quisling. 
Third, a rhetorical issue. Judges—and I am one of them—dearly 
love to invoke the old names: Holmes Maitland, Cardozo . . . We do 
it for the authority of time and precedent it vests in us.  It suggests 
that the views of these people, by sheer force of their intelligence and 
authority, are the views of today.  Here’s a nice example of an 
invocation that goes from 1951 back to 1936 to 1857: 
 
Cf. the oft-quoted language of Lord Wensleydale, in 
Grey v. Pearson, 6 H.L.C. 61, [1857] quoted in 3 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Rev.Ed. (1936), sec. 618, p. 
1777, reading as follows: ‘The grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless 
that would lead to some absurdity, or some 
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the 
instrument, in which case the grammatical and 
ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to 
avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further 
[sic: farther].’ 
 
Achen v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 105 Cal.App.2d 113, 121 
(1951). At this point Achen was not endorsing the “plain meaning” 
rule, which is what Lord Wensleydale was discussing, if one reads his 
next two sentences.77 Instead, Achen only held here that if there’s an 
ambiguity, extrinsic evidence relating to that ambiguity can be 
considered, but not in connection with other language. The funny 
thing is that when Lord Wensleydale made his remarks in England in 
1857, seven years after California was admitted to the Union, the will 
theory—the reliance on the intent of the parties—was dominant in 
the United States, even if some were sounding the alarm on behalf of 
 
 76. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1153 
(2008).  The Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) uses the formulation.  Eric A. Zacks, 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and the Future of Modern 
Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 746 (2016). 
 77. “The expression that the rule of construction is to be the intention of the testator 
is apt to lead into error, because that word is capable of being understood in two senses, 
viz., as descriptive of that which the testator intended to do, and of that which is the 
meaning of the words he has used.  The will must be in writing, and the only question is, 
what is the meaning of the words used in that writing.”  Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61, 
106. 
 
 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 17:2 184 
the commercial classes.  It would not be until closer to the turn of the 
century that plain meaning doctrine would ascend in this country,78 
only to see it under savage attack by Cardozo and others by the time 
the cited Williston 1936 tome came out, and definitely on its way out 
by the time of the 1951 Achen opinion. Those twists and turns, even if 
not of great moment here, are obscured by the citations to the past. 
But judges like quoting past masters, even if we might muddy the 
waters a bit when we do it. 
 
III. TRIAL OF CONTRACT ACTIONS 
 
“Cases do not unfold their principles for the asking. 




The central problem in trying a contract action is the number of 
times the trial shifts between the judge and the jury. If it shifts once, 
there are no problems. If more, there are problems. If the case shifts 
from to judge to jury to judge, the problems are not difficult and 
usually involve at worst some repeated testimony. But if the case 
includes a shift from jury to judge to jury, the problems will also 
include the issue of bringing the jury back after a hiatus (during 
which e.g., the judge is writing a decision).  In one of the worst-case 
scenarios outlined below, the trial shifts from judge (integration 
issue) to jury (an issue, on which meaning depends, depends on 
disputed facts) to judge (who decides the meaning of the contract) to 
the jury (breach, damages). The problems are aggravated further 
when there are different contract-like claims, and related defenses, 
which seem to require a series of different shifts. We can think of these 
as trial management issues. 
 
3.1.1 Conflicting Contract Doctrines 
 
 
 78. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2006) 
(noting that in “the mid-nineteenth century…The task of federal and state courts alike was 
to search for “the true exposition of the contract or instrument…”). 
 79. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 25 (1921) (Dover ed. 
2005). 
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These management problems are aggravated by the risk of 
confusion as we read appellate opinions. Similar sounding phrases 
are used at different stages of contract interpretation (what the 
contract means) and implication (whether there is a contract), and so 
it is easy to quote phrases out of context; and some opinions seem to 
make equivalences of different tests, or of different stages of contract 
interpretation and implication.  Exacerbating these problems is the 
fact that current contract law is the result of centuries of development 
– centuries which have seen radical shifts in thought on what 
contracts are, how to understand and enforce them, and so on.  For 
example, some have urged that contract is what the parties say it is, 
whatever seems to have been their intent;80 others have held an 
objective view, that the words of the contract are the sole measure of 
its import and effect;81 and there have been other positions, too.  
Today, court opinions invoke all these strands, sometimes all at once 
in an introductory section, and sometimes just at different stages of 
the process of contract implication and interpretation.  Often, courts 
introduce their analyses by rote recitation of principles without any 
sense of irony or noting that the principles seem to point in different 
directions, e.g., subjective intent and objective meaning. E.g., 
The goal of contractual interpretation is to 
determine and give effect to the mutual intention of 
the parties . . . a “court’s paramount consideration in 
construing [a] stipulation is the parties’ objective 
intent . . . inferred, if possible, solely from the written 
provisions of the contract . . . the rules of interpretation 
of written contracts are for the purpose of ascertaining 
 
 80. E.g., “the overriding goal of interpretation is to give effect to the parties’ mutual 
intentions as of the time of contracting...” Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc., 158 Cal. 
App.4th 1582, 1605 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).  See also e.g., “Mutual intent is 
determinative of contract formation because there is no contract unless the parties thereto 
assent, and they must assent to the same thing, in the same sense....”  Am. Emp’r Grp, Inc. 
v. Emp’t Dev. Dept., 154 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 (2007), quoting Banner Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Superior Court (Alchemy Filmworks, Inc.), 62 Cal. App. 4th 348, 358 (1998). 
 81. E.g., “Contracts must mean what they say, or the entire exercise of negotiating 
and executing them defeats the purpose of contract law—predictability and stability…”  
Hot Rods, LLC v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1176 (2015); 
Iqbal v. Ziadeh, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1, 8 (2017) (“California recognizes the objective theory of 
contracts (Berman v. Bromberg (1997) 56 Cal. App. 4th 936, 948 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 777]), 
under which ‘[i]t is the objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the contract, rather 
than the subjective intent of one of the parties, that controls interpretation’”).  So for 
example under the objective approach, it is irrelevant that a party didn’t read a contract 
or didn’t know there was particular term in it.  E.g., Mission Viejo Emergency Med. Ass’n  
v. Beta Healthcare Grp., 197 Cal. App. 4th 1146, 1155 (2011). 
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the meaning of the words used therein . . . [a] contract 
must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual 
intention of the parties as it existed at the time of 
contracting . . . The language of a contract is to govern 
its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit . 
. .  
 
People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 107 Cal.App.4th 516, 
525 (2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in 
original).  All these positions have been true at different times and in 
different contexts, but run together they don’t help much. 
 
3.1.2 Brief Historical Note 
 
While I have discussed the history of contract in Section 1, I 
provide here in context an example of the conflation of principles 
from different periods, focusing on the critically important moment 
when contract interpretation statutes were enacted. 
Most of the California statutes on contracts were enacted in 1872; 
and one or another, or many, of these provisions are cited in most 
modern appellate opinions on contract. These provisions are heavy 
on the intent of the parties.82 This was consistent with William W. 
Story’s TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1844) where he firmly 
endorsed the device of focusing on “the mutual agreement of the 
parties” as the defining feature of contract,83 what has been called the 
“will” theory of contract. 
But contract law changed after California’s 1872 enactments.  
Examples include the works of Holmes and Williston. Holmes, who 
wrote THE COMMON LAW in 1881, “explicitly banished from his 
description of the elements of contract any reference to the subjective 
wills or intentions of the parties.”84 And Samuel Williston’s TREATISE 
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS in 1920 announced the ascendancy of the 
objective theory of contract, rejecting language that sought to discern 
 
 82. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1636, 1639–40, 1643, 1648, 1649, 1653; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 
§§ 1859–60. 
 83. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 917, 952 (1974); HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 185 (1977). 
 84. Patrick J. Kelley, A Critical Analysis of Holmes’s Theory of Contract, 75 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1681, 1728 (2000).  See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881), also available at 
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2449. 
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the “meeting of the minds” in agreements and looking to the ‘plain 
meaning’ of words.85 This shift is on display in e.g., Brant v. California 
Dairies, 4 Cal. 2d 128, 132–33 (1935), which expressly rejected 
evidence on the meeting of the minds in favor of implementing 
Williston’s views. 
Now, perhaps we have sort of assemblage of the two notions.86  
But the point remains that opinions tend to invoke clashing principles 
of contract from across the centuries, including statutes of dubious 
currency, as if there were one consistent set of doctrines. 
 
3.2 THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS 
 
The trial management issues must of course be mapped out in 
advance of trial.  The parties’ agreement can solve most of the 
problems, but (i) many parties won’t agree, refusing to commit to any 
legal position; and (ii) many parties do not have a position on the core 
issues, such as whether they have a right to a jury on a claim.  Sorting 
all this out takes a lot of time, and many cases are far from being ready 
for jury selection on the assigned trial date. 
We need to know the parties’ positions on issues such as whether 
they contend they have a right to a jury on an issue, whether there is 
an ambiguity in the contract, what kind of ambiguity it is (extrinsic 
or intrinsic), and so on.  As noted, parties frequently at first refuse to 
commit: they contend the contract is unambiguous, and that no 
extrinsic evidence is needed, but that if for any reason anyone thinks 
there is an ambiguity, they want to reserve the right to use extrinsic 
evidence; and so on.  This is unsatisfactory. 
Perhaps the trial brief states the party’s position, but it’s unclear 
if this can be treated as a preclusive admission. A party may have 
answered contention interrogatories on the issues (usually not) but it 
is not clear if those are preclusive in the sense that having taken a 
position (i.e., the contract is not ambiguous) a party is powerless to 
 
 85. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 24, at 200; Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering 
Williston, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207, 275 n.13 (2005) (noting these: “THOMAS D. 
CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 
ON CONTRACTS 451 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing Williston’s objective approach); LON L. 
FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 362 (6th ed. 1996) (discussing 
the “strict objectivism of classical contract law” as evidenced by Williston); RICHARD E. 
SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 239 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing 
the objective theory of contracts)”). 
 86. Jiri Janko, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation: Incorporating Semiotic 
Theory of Meaning-Making into Legal Interpretation, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 601 (2007). 
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change it. Typically, interrogatory responses are admissible against the 
responding party, but they are not preclusive. At trial, the party can 
introduce contrary evidence, subject perhaps to the impeachment of 
the interrogatory responses. Positions taken in summary judgment 
and adjudication motions are unlikely to be useful: They either 
resulted in a motion’s grant, in which case the issue is moot, or they 
did not, in which case the matter cannot be used at trial.87 Responses 
to requests for admissions are preclusive,88 and they can go to legal 
conclusions based on facts,89 but that may not extend to purely legal 
issues such as whether there is a right to a jury for a certain claim.  It 
is possible that a position successfully pressed at an earlier time, such 
as in the context of a motion for summary adjudication, might bind 
the party under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.90 It’s not entirely 
clear if under state law the doctrine applies to assertions of law,91 but 
it probably does.92  The motions in limine may or may not map out 
the problem; typically, they don’t because parties are not concerned 
with trial management, or at least, not as concerned as the judge, who 
is greatly concerned about it. 
Thus, the judge must conduct pretrial proceedings designed to 
have the parties commit to positions, make agreements where they 
can, and to allow the judge to inform the parties which issues will be 
tried to the court or to the jury, and in which order. This can take 
weeks of briefing, or more. 
Next, I discuss some of the basic contract rules in order to explain 
the steps. I, thereafter, suggest to manage the trial. 
 
3.3 BASIC RULES 
 
Contract cases usually have four parts: determinations of the 
scope of the agreement, the meaning of the agreement, whether it was 




 87. See generally Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c (n)(2)–(3). 
 88. WEIL & BROWN, ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE 
TRIAL ¶ 8:1387 (Rutter: 2020) (hereinafter “Rutter”). 
 89. Rutter ¶ 8:1299. 
 90. Kerley v. Weber, 27 Cal. App. 5th 1187, 1195 (2018). 
 91. Jackson v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. App. 4th 171, 188 (1997). 
 92. Nist v. Hall, 24 Cal. App. 5th 40, 48 (2018) (explaining the position on whether a 
statute applied). 
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3.3.1. Scope 
 
The parties may not disagree where there written agreement. But 
often there are disagreements based on the existence of (i) oral 
statements; (ii) sub agreements such as work orders, supplemental 
writings, and invoices, all issued pursuant to an earlier agreement 
(such as a “master agreement”) but with other terms, or where it 
unclear if these were issued pursuant to a “master” agreement; (iii) 
multiple roughly simultaneous written agreements such as 
employment agreements, employment manuals, and a separate 
arbitration agreement, or other terms and conditions from various 
sources that seem to relate to a transaction;93 (iv) different written 
agreements over time apparently relating to the same subject matter 
and with—or without—identical sets of parties. 
There are some issues lurking here. First, did the parties intend 
to put their agreement into writings?  Second, if so, which are the 
writings that the parties intended to reflect their agreement? And 
third, did the parties intend to put their entire agreement in writing—





 93. It is interesting to note the “Agreement” which governs a consumer’s use of 
Amazon’s Alexa device.  Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON (Dec. 12, 2020), 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 
(“please read these Alexa Terms of Use, including the Alexa Communication Schedule, 
the Amazon.com Privacy Notice, the Amazon.com Conditions of Use, and the other 
applicable rules, policies, and terms posted on the Amazon.com website, available 
through your Alexa App, or provided with Alexa Enabled Products (collectively, this 
“Agreement”).  By using Alexa, you agree to be bound by the terms of this Agreement.”).  
Four other agreements are expressly called here, but others are referred to (“the other 
applicable rules”) which can be found in three other and different places.  Alexa and Alexa 
Device Terms, AMAZON 
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201566380.  If one 
uses Alexa with other parties, more agreements apparently come into force.  Alexa Voice 
Service Agreement, SUTTER HEALTH (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.sutterhealth.org/alexa-
voice-service-agreement.  In related situations, “if you are a vigilant consumer and you 
install a Nest thermostat in your bedroom, you should review a minimum of 1,000 privacy 
contracts, because everything is flowing to third parties which is flowing to third parties, 
which is flowing to third parties.”  Noah Kulwin, Shoshana Zuboff on Surveillance 
Capitalism’s Threat to Democracy (Feb. 24, 2019) 
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/shoshana-zuboff-q-and-a-the-age-of-
surveillance-capital.html.  Related issues are discussed in detail in my The Internet and 
Contract Formation, 18 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. (2021). 
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This scope issue is often thought of as whether the contract is 
“integrated.” It can be integrated in one, or more, documents. This 
issue is for the judge, even if it depends on the resolution of disputed 
facts. 
 
(1) An integrated agreement is a writing or writings 
constituting a final expression of one or more terms of 
an agreement. 
(2) Whether there is an integrated agreement is to be 
determined by the court as a question preliminary to 
determination of a question of interpretation or to 
application of the parol evidence rule. 
(3) Where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing 
which in view of its completeness and specificity 
reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is 
taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is 
established by other evidence that the writing did not 
constitute a final expression. 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (1981). 
 
c. Proof of integration.  Whether a writing has been 
adopted as an integrated agreement is a question of 
fact to be determined in accordance with all relevant 
evidence. The issue is distinct from the issues whether 
an agreement was made and whether the document is 
genuine, and also from the issue whether it was 
intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the 
agreement. See § 210; compare Uniform Commercial 
Code § 2-202. Ordinarily the issue whether there is an 
integrated agreement is determined by the trial judge 
in the first instance as a question preliminary to an 
interpretative ruling or to the application of the parol 
evidence rule. See §§ 212, 213 . . .  
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (1981), comment c. 
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As the Restatement warns us, the integration issue is separate 
from and prior to the application of the parol evidence rule, which 
may come into play after the integration analysis is complete.94 
In California, there are said to be two “levels” of integration.  (1) 
Is the identified writing (or writings) the final agreement? And (2) is 
the writing the “complete and exclusive statement” of the 
agreement?95  If only (1) is true, additional consistent terms may be 
introduced.96  If (2) is true, then nothing can be introduced to vary or 
add to the terms.97  Many  opinions use the term “integration” to refer 
to this second, more complete version of integration.98 
We’re familiar with a so-called integration clause, which is 
usually evidence of a level 2 (full) integration.  But even without such 
a clause, a review of the agreement itself might manifest the parties’ 
intent to have full level 2 integration.99 
Once the integration analysis is done,100 the court has fixed the 
scope of the agreement. So “[w]hen the parties to a written contract 
have agreed to it as an ‘integration’—a complete and final 
embodiment of the terms of an agreement—parol evidence cannot be 
 
 94. See also e.g., Morey v. Vannucci, 64 Cal. App. 4th 904, 912–13 n.4 (1998). 
 95. Kanno v. Marwit Capital Partners II, L.P., 18 Cal. App. 5th 987, 999 (2017). 
 96. E.g., Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 187 Cal. App.3d 299, 314 
(1986) (“Parol evidence is admissible to establish the terms of the complete agreement of 
the parties only if the written agreement is not the complete and final embodiment of that 
agreement”). 
 97. On the parol evidence rule, see Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera 
Prod. Credit Assn., 55 Cal. 4th 1169, 1174 (2013) (“when the parties put all the terms of 
their agreement in writing, the writing itself becomes the agreement.  The written terms 
supersede statements made during the negotiations.  Extrinsic evidence of the 
agreement’s terms is thus irrelevant”); Archer v. Coinbase, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 5th 266 (2020) 
(barring extrinsic evidence is e.g., custom and usage); Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 
Cal. 4th 336, 343, 83 P.3d 497, 501–02 (2004) (the “parol evidence rule …generally prohibits 
the introduction of any extrinsic evidence, whether oral or written, to vary, alter or add to 
the terms of an integrated written instrument. …The rule does not, however, prohibit the 
introduction of extrinsic evidence “to explain the meaning of a written contract ... [if] the 
meaning urged is one to which the written contract terms are reasonably susceptible”) 
(emphasis supplied, internal quotations removed); Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal. 2d 222, 225 
(1968) (“When only part of the agreement is integrated, the same rule applies to that part, 
but parol evidence may be used to prove elements of the agreement not reduced to 
writing”). 
 98. E.g., Archer v. Coinbase, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 5th 266 (2020). 
 99. Kanno, 18 Cal. App. 5th at 1000. 
 100. See, e.g., Kanno v. Marwit Capital Partners II, L.P., 18 Cal. App. 5th 987, 999–1000 
(2017); Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell W. E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 14 (1993). 
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used to add to or vary its terms.”101  Most importantly for our 
purposes, the integration issue is only for the judge.102 
This issue is handled as a Ev. C. § 405 hearing; not under §§ 402, 
403.103  That is, the judge decides integration.  One should not be 
misled by cases which could be read as suggesting there might be 
issues of fact—perhaps for the jury. The issue is usually one of law,104 
and even where there are factual issues,105 the matter is still for the 
trial judge.106 
The court tells the parties who has the burden of (i) producing 
evidence and of (ii) proof (two different things); the judge may take 
evidence, and then determines the preliminary fact (i.e. here, what 
constitutes the agreement). The jury is not informed of the procedure: 
it either sees the disputed document or it does not; it either hears the 
parol evidence or it does not.107 It may not be obvious which party has 
the burdens just mentioned: thus, even for this first step, it is 
conceivable that the court will require briefing. 
 
3.3.1.2 Impact Of Integration Clause 
 
The classic integration clause reads something like this: the 
document “constitutes the entire contract” and “exclusively 
determines the rights and obligations of these parties thereunder, 
notwithstanding any prior course of dealings, custom or usage of 
trade, or course of performance.”108  The R.W.L. Enterprises court did 
not think the clause barred it from looking at for example other 
“contemporaneously executed writings” although in the end it 
rejected the impact of those items.109 Generally, these sorts of clauses 
 
 101. Kanno, 18 Cal. App. 5th at 999–1000. 
 102. Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 139, 145 (1975); Esbensen v. 
Userware Internat., Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 631, 638 n.4 (1992) (“it is a question for the trial 
court rather than the jury”); Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 5 Cal. App. 4th 1412, 1434 
(1992). 
 103. Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 139, 146 (1975). 
 104. Williams v. Atria Las Posas, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1051 (2018). 
 105. Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach 
Country Club, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 944, 954 (2003) (“Whether a contract is integrated is 
a question of law when the evidence of integration is not in dispute”) (emphasis supplied). 
 106. Esbensen v. Userware Internat., Inc., 11 Cal. App. 4th 631, 638 n.4 (1992). 
 107. See generally M. SIMONS, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 1:42 (2020) (Fed. R. 
Evid. § 405 discussion). 
 108. R.W.L. Enterprises v. Oldcastle, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 1019, 1031 (2017). 
 109. Colaco v. Cavotec SA, 25 Cal. App. 5th 1172, 1203 (2018) (integration clause does 
not bar review of contemporaneous agreements). 
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are very good evidence that the identified writings are the final and 
complete agreement; but the clauses are not preclusive.110 
 
3.3.1.3  Subject Of Agreement 
 
But an agreement is of necessity regarding a certain subject, and 
the clauses often say this expressly, in words to the effect that the 
writing is the complete agreement on the ‘subject thereof’.  So, an 
integrated agreement on my selling a car just relates to the car sale; 
not to some other deal we might have on, say, oranges. This 
apparently simple notion can quickly erupt into a full-blown 
disagreement over what the “subject matter” of the agreement is. For 
example, we might have an integrated employment agreement with 
an arbitration clause and then later termination agreement which is 
silent on arbitration (in which case that is not the ‘subject’ of the 
termination agreement), or has a narrower arbitration clause than the 
employment agreement (in which case we may say arbitration is a 
‘subject’). This produces different results on the extent to which 
arbitration is prescribed.111 
 
3.3.1.4  Effect of Order of Agreements 
 
As suggested in Oxford Preparatory Academy, with agreements 
signed at different times, the later agreement may well be in force 
despite an integration clause in the earlier agreement.112 The point is 
made here: 
 
However, “[t]he parol evidence rule precludes 
extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
agreements that contradict, vary, or add to an 
integrated writing—it does not relate to future 
agreements and does not bar extrinsic evidence that 




 110. Kanno v. Marwit Capital Partners II, L.P., 18 Cal. App. 5th 987, 1007 (2017). 
 111. Compare Oxford Preparatory Acad. v. Edlighten Learning Sol., 34 Cal. App. 5th 
605, 612 (2019); Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary US LLP, 243 Cal. App. 4th 1, 15 
(2015); with Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Grp., 53 Cal. App. 5th 539 (2020). 
 112. Williams v. Atria Las Posas, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1048, 1052 (2018). 
 113. In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases, 211 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1413 (2012). 
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3.3.2 Meaning 
 
Next, the meaning of the agreement must be decided. 
The notion of “meaning” of a contract usually refers to one or 
both of these: 
(A) The internal structure and logic of the contract: 
what entails what; what event is a condition precedent 
to what performance; whether clause X is an 
obligation, a condition, a remedy, background, etc., or 
none of these. For example, whether “Jon builds the 
house by April, and I give him my Bugatti in June” 
creates a condition precedent to the delivery of the 
Bugatti or two independent performances. 
(B) External mapping: the problems of translation to, 
or mapping of, events in real world, usually whether 
a certain event was a breach, or created a triggering 
condition, and so on; whether specific words refer to a 
given real world event (or lack of event). For example, 
whether insurance coverage for a “spill” refers to a 
slow leaching over many years; or if a promise to 
deliver a ton of “fruit” incudes fruit juice, etc. 
 
The determination of meaning may require many steps, and 
resort to both the judge and the jury, perhaps in more than two 
phases. 
First the parties must state whether the contract is ambiguous; 
they may logically disagree on its meaning and still each contend the 
contract is not ambiguous.  If they agree it is not ambiguous, but 
disagree on the meaning, the judge decides the meaning.114 
 
3.3.2.1 Isolating Ambiguity 
Just asking the parties if the contract is ambiguous is not likely 
to produce results. Contracts have many clauses and the parties will 
surely disagree on some of them.  The trick is to identify the material 
disputes.  One approach is work backwards from the breach 
allegations. Thus (a) if there is a breach, do the parties agree on the 
consequences as cited in the complaint? If not, the parties should be 
able to identify the dispute in the remedies section. (b) Reviewing the 
 
 114. Fed. R. Evid. 310(a); Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 162 Cal. App. 4th 
1107, 1125 (2008). 
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allegations of breach, do the parties agree that the complaint’s 
allegation, if true, is a breach? If not, the parties should be able to 
identify an obligation as to which (i) the parties disagree on its 
requirements or (ii) one side claims is not an obligation at all. Other 
material disputes must be winkled out in other ways. For example, 
some disputes depend on the contract’s structure of conditions, with 
plaintiff claiming defendant’s performance was due, and defendant 
arguing it was not due.  It may be that a meet-and-confer on jury 
instructions will precipitate the parties’ disagreements. 
But the parties must identify exactly what contract language is 
ambiguous, and if it’s rendered ambiguous by extrinsic evidence, the 
parties must specify the evidence.115  If they don’t present that 
extrinsic evidence, or if they don’t identify an ambiguity, the court 
will construe the contract as a matter of law.116 
Again, it is worth emphasizing that this use of extrinsic evidence 
(EE) has nothing to do with, and is not barred by, the parol evidence 
rule.117 
 
3.3.2.2 Intrinsic v. Extrinsic 
 
If one party contends there is an ambiguity, it must explain 
whether the ambiguity is intrinsic (one sees the ambiguity without 
looking at extrinsic evidence [EE]), or extrinsic (only EE will reveal 
the ambiguity).  So perhaps we agree I will sell you my house, which 
seems quite clear on its face. But EE shows I have two houses, so I 
may wish to argue for an ambiguity based on the EE (and then later 
also use EE to prove which house you and I had agreed to).118 
 
 115. Alameda City Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Dep’t of Water Res., 
213 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1190 (2013). 
 116. City of Fresno v. Fresno Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, 51 Cal. App. 5th 282, 292, 296 
(2020). 
 117. Oakland-Alameda City. Coliseum Auth. v. Golden State Warriors, LLC, 53 Cal. 
App. 5th 807 at *6 (2020). 
 118. We should not confuse this with a very different issue, which is that sometimes 
because of the words used it’s pretty clear there’s no agreement at all.  That was the 
consensus on the venerable Peerless case. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418 (1899).  The delivery was contracted from the ship 
Peerless, but EE showed that there were two such named ships.  See, e.g., Robert L. 
Birmingham, Holmes on ‘Peerless’: Raffles v. Wichelhaus and the Objective Theory of Contract, 
47 U. PITT. L. REV. 183 (1985).   The parties didn’t agree to the same thing, so there was no 
agreement.  For a fun item on this classic case—it won’t take you long to read it—see 
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Problem of the Two Ships Peerless, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1097 
(2005). 
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If the ambiguity is intrinsic, the judge decides the meaning. 
 
3.3.2.3 Juries and Extrinsic Evidence 
 
If the ambiguity is extrinsic, based on EE, there are two 
alternative paths. First, if there are material issues of credibility 
(conflicting EE), then there is usually a right to a jury to determine the 
facts.119 Second, if there are no such issues (e.g., just as there are not 
when a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is properly 
granted), the judge resolves the impact of the EE and then the 
meaning of the contract.120 
The reader will also be familiar with the notion that the EE, at 
this stage, is received in some provisional way, that it is not 
“admitted” but rather ‘preliminarily received.’121 It doesn’t matter 
that the judge thinks the written contract is clear and unambiguous; 
she must provisionally receive the EE to determine if it shows there is 
indeed an ambiguity. It’s not clear what this special evidentiary status 
really is, because of course the judge considers the EE and it becomes 
part of the record. This probably just means the jury may not get to 
see it. The special evidentiary status may reflect the fact that while EE 
cannot “add to, detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract, 
these terms must first be determined before it can be decided whether 
or not extrinsic evidence is being offered for a prohibited purpose.”122 
 
3.3.2.4 Reasonably Susceptible 
 
Whether the first or second path is taken, whether the issue goes 
to the jury or the judge, the parties are limited in what they can argue. 
They can only argue that the EE shows a meaning to which the 
writing is “reasonably susceptible.”123  This can be tricky, because 
there may be a conflict: from whose point of view do we determine 
that the language could plausibly mean something? The issue is a 
 
 119. De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482, 505–06 (1997). 
 120. Id.; see generally Morey v. Vannucci, 64 Cal. App. 4th 904, 912–13 (1998). 
 121. Wolf v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 1350–51 (2004); Brown v. 
Goldstein, 34 Cal. App. 5th 418, 432 (2019), citing the case routinely thought to have 
originated this test in this state, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging, 
69 Cal.2d 33, 39-40 (1968). 
 122. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co, 69 Cal. 2d at 39. 
 123. Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Grp. Staffing Co., Inc., 54 Cal.App.5th 670, 675-6 (Cal. Ct. 
App., 2020); Oakland-Alameda City Coliseum Auth., 53 Cal. Appat *6  (looking for a 
“plausible” reading). 
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legal, not factual one,124 strongly suggesting that the test is an 
objective one, not dependent on an idiosyncratic party view.125 
 
3.3.2.4.1 Standards for Deciding Words are Reasonably Susceptible 
of a Meaning 
 
There are at least two difficulties here. First, let us recall that it 
doesn’t matter if the judge thinks language is ambiguous or not when 
deciding whether to admit EE to discern ambiguity: The judge may 
think he understands the plain meaning of the words, but EE might 
prove him wrong. Let’s call that the Agnostic Rule.  At the same time, 
we say judges decide whether the words are “susceptible” of a 
meaning or not; if not, the proffered EE is not further considered.  
Let’s call that the Objective Rule.126  It is not easy to discern the 
difference between these two Rules and how they prescribe different 
approaches to discerning meaning.  In many situations it may be 
 
 124. Brown v. Goldstein, 34 Cal. App. 5th 418, 433 (2019); Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 
4th 1159, 1165 (1992). 
 125. This means of course that a trial court’s objective view may be displaced by the 
appellate court’s objective view, done on de novo review.  E.g., Moore v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 39 Cal. App. 5th 280, 287, 296-97 (2019).  It also means that courts of appeal 
may disagree among themselves on whether a word is “reasonably susceptible” to a 
meaning, Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 384, 389 (2006).  Unfortunately, these 
sorts of divergences tend to undermine the implicit claim of the test to be an objective one. 
 126. Some opinions may confuse the issue, with language suggesting that the 
provisional EE is used to decide not just if there’s an ambiguity but also if the words are 
susceptible of a proffered meaning.  See the use of “i.e.” in the next quote which seems to 
make an equivalence between (1) determining ambiguity and (2) reasonable 
susceptibility: “The decision whether to admit parol evidence involves a two-step process.  
First, the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence 
concerning the parties’ intentions to determine “ambiguity,” i.e., whether the language is 
“reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation urged by a party.  If in light of the extrinsic 
evidence the court decides the language is “reasonably susceptible” to the interpretation 
urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step—interpreting the 
contract. (Blumenfeld v. R.H. Macy & Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 38, 45, 154 Cal. Rptr. 652.)”  
Winet v. Price, 4 Cal. App. 4th 1159, 1165 (1992).  The same ambiguous reading could be 
given to this: “The question whether proffered extrinsic evidence renders a contract 
reasonably susceptible to ambiguity is a judicial function to be decided initially by the trial 
court, and independently by the appellate court.”  Abers v. Rounsavell, 189 Cal.App.4th 
348, 357 (2010).  Contrast this with the Supreme Court’s phraseology, which makes it fairly 
clear that reasonable susceptibility is not proved one way or the other by the EE: “Extrinsic 
evidence is ‘admissible to interpret the instrument, but not to give it a meaning to which 
it is not reasonably susceptible,” Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 62 Cal. 2d 861, 865 (1965); 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37, 442 P.2d 
641, 644 (1968) (“The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of 
a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous 
on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the 
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible”). 
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perfectly obvious that a term can’t possibly mean what a party says it 
means: perhaps “car” doesn’t mean “tiger” (although we’ll look more 
closely at that below); “Insurer shall pay $10” cannot possibly mean 
“insurer shall pay $20” or “Insurer shall never pay.” In these 
situations, applying the Objective Rule, the judge is deciding, without 
the EE, that the words do or don’t mean something.  If he decides the 
words cannot mean something, he won’t look at the EE presented in 
support of the proffered interpretation. He just figures this out on his 
own.127 But the Agnostic Rule tells the judge he may not decide the 
meaning of the words on his own.  Justice Baxter has noted the 
ambiguity of holding potential interpretations to just what the words 
will bear vs. allowing EE to create an ambiguity regardless of the 
apparent plain meaning of the words.128 
 
3.3.2.4.2  Private Language 
 
The second difficulty is presented by the notion of private 
language. The parties may use words in a way that only they mean. 
So they may indeed intend that “car” means “tiger.” There are many 
rules of interpretation which focus this way on what the parties 
meant, such as rules which look to what one party thought the other 
party believed, or rules which consider the acts of the parties at the 
time (e.g., in our case, buying a tiger cage and hiring a tiger trainer), 
and so on.129  But from the perspective of the Objective Rule, ‘car’ can’t 
possibly mean ‘tiger’ so the judge will refuse to accept EE offered to 
support this reading.130 This Objective Rule is thus at odds with a 
more general principle that we seek to understand contract language 
as the parties intended. And there is language in some opinions 
which, apparently in support of that more general principle, seem to 
require the judge to attend to private, idiosyncratic meaning: 
 
 
 127. Alameda City Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Dep’t of Water Res., 
213 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1189 (2013) (“Therefore, if the language of the instrument cannot 
carry the meaning ascribed to it by the party claiming an ambiguity, the case is over”) 
(multiple internal quotes removed). 
 128. Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 39 Cal. 4th 384, 395–96 (2006) (Baxter, J., 
concurring). 
 129. E.g., DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc., 176 Cal. App. 4th 697, 712–
13 (2009). 
 130. 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, “Ambiguity as a prerequisite—’Private language’ 
and abbreviations,” § 33:44 (4th ed.) 
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Written words may have special meanings to the 
contracting parties that are not apparent on the face of 
the document itself. (ACL Technologies, Inc. v. 
Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co.(1993) 17 
Cal.App.4th 1773, 1793, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 206 [“. . . courts 
should allow parol evidence to explain special 
meanings which the individual parties to a contract 
may have given certain words”].) 
 
Abers v. Rounsavell, 189 Cal. App. 4th 348, 356 (2010).  ACL Technologies 
can be very easily read to endorse a private language interpretation.131  
Neither of these cases, however, actually allows private language to 
govern interpretation. So for example we have Abers’ reference to 
Justice Baxter’s concurrence, endorsing the Objective Rule: 
 
An agreement is not ambiguous merely because 
the parties (or judges) disagree about its meaning. 
Taken in context, words still matter. As Justice Baxter 
has pointed out, “written agreements whose language 
appears clear in the context of the parties’ dispute are 
not open to claims of ‘latent’ ambiguity.” (Dore, supra, 
39 Cal.4th at p. 396, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 668, 139 P.3d 56, 
conc. opn. of Baxter, J.) 
 
Abers, op cit.  So what I have referred to a second problem or difficulty 
relating to the Objective Rule might be better thought of as only a 
point of potential confusion. 
 
3.3.2.4.3 Technical Language; Usage 
 
There is one more point to be made, which is that we should 
distinguish private or idiosyncratic language from technical 
references understood by more than just the parties, even if not 
understood generally and not understood by the judge. C.C. §§ 
1645,132 1644.133 This is a very different kettle of fish, and EE designed 
 
 131. ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 
4th 1773, 1793–1794 (1993). 
 132. “Technical words are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the 
profession or business to which they relate, unless clearly used in a different sense.” 
 133. “The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular 
sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning; unless used by the parties in a 
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to support such a reading should be accepted by the judge.  That is, it 
is true that a judge should be open to a “special meaning” of terms, 
but only if that meaning is given “by usage.”134 And by “usage” we 
mean trade usage, not just that of the parties, but of a larger group to 
which the parties belong. Thus “‘usage’ is a uniform practice or 
course of conduct followed in certain lines of business or professions, 
or in some procedure or phase of a business or profession.”135  In this 
sense, ‘usage’ parallels ‘custom’.136 
 
3.3.2.5 Role Of Experts 
 
It might be thought that expert testimony is not admissible at this 
stage, because after all the decision whether to accept EE, and 
specifically what meaning the written words are susceptible of, is 
based on the Objective Rule and the court, not the jury, must interpret 
the contract (Ev. C. § 310). And indeed we have opinions like this: 
“‘[e]xpert testimony is not generally admissible on the question of the 
meaning of particular policy language’ because ‘it is the court’s 
function to interpret policy language.’”137 But, as should be obvious, 
experts are often needed to explain industry customs and usage, and 
their testimony is indeed admissible.138 
 
technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which case the 
latter must be followed.” 
 134. MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 31 Cal. 4th 635, 648 (2003); Cal. Civ. Code § 
1644. 
 135. Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 18 Cal. App. 4th 1, 15–16 (1993); 
Heggblade-Marguleas-Tenneco, Inc. v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 3d 948, 955 
(1976) (established trade usage and custom under the U.C.C.); Howard Entm’t, Inc. v. 
Kudrow 208 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1114 (2012) (industry usage and custom); Southern Pac. 
Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Pac. Pipelines, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1244 (1999) (same); 
Ermolieff v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 19 Cal. 2d 543, 549, 500 (1942) (“general custom and 
usage” in the industry, citing CC § 1644); Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc., 35 Cal. 
App. 4th 880, 890 (1995) (custom and usage is admissible). 
 136. E.g., Miller v. Stults, 143 Cal. App. 2d 592, 601 (1956).  There is yet another source 
of confusion here as we discuss custom and usage.  Regarding the wholly distinct question 
of whether the actions of the parties have in effect created an agreement, their own 
actions—their own custom and usage, if you will—may evidence that sort of agreement, 
known as an implied contract.  So, we might say that the parties’ “course of conduct 
implies they had a distribution agreement,” Varni Bros. Corp. v. Wine World, Inc., 35 Cal. 
App .4th 880, 889 (1995).  See Cal. Civ. Code § 1621. 
 137. Tustin Field Gas & Food, Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 5th 220, 231 
(2017). 
 138. Howard Entm’t, Inc. v. Kudrow, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1102, 1114 (2012); Wolf v. 
Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 1355 (2004); Scoville v. De Bretteville, 50 Cal. App. 
2d 622, 629 (1942); Law v. Northern Assurance Co. of London, 165 Cal. 394, 407 (1913). 
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3.3.2.6  Whether Credibility is an Issue 
 
Let us say the judge has reviewed the parties’ positions on 
ambiguity, has decided that that the wording of the contract is 
reasonably susceptible to a meaning offered by a party. The next step 
is to decide if the acceptance of the EE depends on credibility: is there 
a conflict in the EE that needs a fact finder to resolve? If not, the judge 
proceeds alone to the next and final step of resolving the ambiguity. 
If there is a credibility dispute, the parties have the right to have a 
jury decide the matter.  Note that if there is no conflict in the EE, but 
only a disagreement about what inferences could be drawn from the 
EE, there is no role for the jury.139 
 
3.3.2.6.1  When Jury Required 
 
This discussion so far obscures an important distinction: do we 
need a conflict in the evidence to invoke a jury, such as two opposed 
witnesses?  Or do we need a jury if one side says the other side’s 
evidence is false, or wants the opportunity to cross-examine 
witnesses to show they are fibbing?  In the summary judgment 
context, facts are not properly disputed unless there is opposed 
evidence (such as a witness): one will not survive the motion by 
telling the judge that she wants the opportunity to cross-examine the 
moving party’s witnesses because they aren’t telling the truth.140 At 
trial, the rule is the contrary: one may well win the trial by convincing 
the jury that the other side’s witnesses are liars, even if one does not 
have any witnesses on an issue. 
Which is it in the present context? When courts write that it is a 
matter of “conflicting extrinsic evidence,”141 or say there was a 
“conflict in the extrinsic evidence,” id. at 1128, it seems to be the 
summary judgment model.142  When they ask whether the issue 
 
 139. Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1107, 1126 (2008). 
 140. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c(e); Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co., 233 Cal. App. 
3d 1505, 1513 n.3 (1991). 
 141. Wolf, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 1127. 
 142. Cf., Brown v. Goldstein (2019) 34 Cal. App. 5th 418, 437 (decided on summary 
judgment). 
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“turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence,” it might be either 
model, but suggestive of the trial model.143 
It appears the summary judgment model is used: 
 
it is jury’s responsibility to resolve any conflict in the 
extrinsic evidence properly admitted to interpret the 
language of a contract. (Medical Operations 
Management, Inc. v. National Health Laboratories, Inc. 
(1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 886, 891–892 & fn. 4, 222 
Cal.Rptr. 455 [where conflicting extrinsic evidence is 
admitted to interpret language of agreement, the 
proper procedure is “for the trial court to require the 
jury to make special findings on the disputed issues 
and then base its interpretation of the contract on those 
findings”].) 
 
Morey v. Vannucci, 64 Cal.App.4th 904, 913 (1998).144 
 
3.3.2.7 Entire Meaning Issue For Jury v. Special Findings 
 
Thus, the judge proceeds directly to the interpretation of the 
contract or, having conducted a trial and asked the jury for “special 
findings,”145 the judge uses those findings to interpret the contract.146 
If the judge has decided that the EE presents jury issues, the 
judge may also simply submit the interpretation issue to the jury. 
Juries are not prohibited from interpreting contracts. 
Interpretation of a written instrument becomes solely a judicial 
function only when it is based on the words of the instrument alone, 
when there is no conflict in the extrinsic evidence, or when a 
determination was made based on incompetent evidence. 
 
 143. Tin Tin Corp. v. Pac. Rim Park, LLC, 170 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1225 (2009); GGIS 
Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1493, 1507 (2008). 
 144. See, e.g., Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport 
Beach Country Club, Inc., 109 Cal. App. 4th 944, 956 (2003) (“When the competent 
extrinsic evidence is in conflict, and thus requires resolution of credibility issues…”); 
Lonely Maiden Prod., LLC v. GoldenTree Asset Mgmt., LP, 201 Cal. App. 4th 368, 377 
(2011) (addressing “material conflict in the extrinsic evidence”); ASP Prop. Group, L.P. v. 
Fard, Inc., 133 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 1267 (2005) (“evidence is in conflict”). 
 145. Morey, 64 Cal. App. 4th at 912–13. 
 146. See Dillingham-Ray Wilson v. City of Los Angeles, 182 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1405 
(2010); De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482, 505–506 (1997). 
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City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 375, 395.  From this, it isn’t clear when the judge should follow 
this option of direct submission to the jury under City of Hope, or 
instead obtain special findings and do the final meaning analysis on 
her own, under Morey. The answer is provided in City of Hope: the 
judge can choose either option.147  I suggest that when the sole 
difference between the parties on meaning depends on the resolution 
of only the EE credibility issues, the jury decides the meaning. 
When the fact finder decides the meaning, it often considers 
extrinsic evidence such as the “parties’ conduct before the 
controversy arose, including their communications.”148  The net effect 
here is that even where the parties have expressed an intent to have 
the written words of their agreement be binding, where an ambiguity 
is located, including an ambiguity solely discernable as a result of the 
consideration of EE, EE may then, in resolving ambiguity, in effect 
create the meaning of the written contract. 
When the resolution of the credibility issue is only part of the 
meaning analysis, the judge should accept special findings and 
decide the contract’s meaning.  I provide examples and discuss this 
further below under “Special findings and Interrogatories.” 
When the jury has completed its work on meaning and EE, the 
trial either resumes as a jury trial if the claims have such a right, or 
continues as a bench trial if no such right exists or the parties have 
waived a jury. That is, the case proceeds to the next steps, breach and 
damages.  Practically, the trial management problem is more difficult, 
because often there are both claims and defenses that do have a jury 








For the judge in an Ev. C.  § 405 hearing: 
• Decide which writings constitute the contract (if any). 
• Decide if there is any integration; level 1; or level 2 integration. 
Consider any integration clause. 
 
 147. City of Hope National Medical Center, 43 Cal. 4th at 396. 
 148. Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 39 Cal. App. 5th 280, 300 (2019). 
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o This produces a result which is used to decide if parol 
evidence will be admitted and if so for which purpose. 
3.4.2 Meaning 
 
• Do the parties identify a material dispute on meaning? 
o If not, there is no further work to be done. 
• Do all parties agree the contract is unambiguous (even if they 
dispute meaning)? 
o If so, the judge decides the meaning. 
o If not, the parties citing ambiguity must identify the 
specific words or terms which are ambiguous; then 
§ Each party must specify the meaning it 
attributes to the ambiguous words. 
§ Each party specifies if the ambiguity is intrinsic 
or is shown by extrinsic evidence [EE]. 
• If the parties agree is it intrinsic, the 
judge decides the meaning. 
• If a party contends the ambiguity is 
revealed by EE, then 
o the judge decides if the words 
are reasonably susceptible to 
the meaning attributed; 
o If the words are not reasonably 
susceptible, then the judge 
rejects the attempt to use EE 
and decides the meaning 
o If the words are reasonably 
susceptible, then the judge 
accepts the EE; all sides are 
permitted to identify relevant 
EE. 
§ The judge decides if 
there is a conflict in the 
EE which must be 
resolved by credibility 
determinations, 
• If not, the judge 
reviews the EE 
and decides the 
meaning. 
• If so, a jury is 
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empaneled 
(unless waived). 



















3.5 JURY TRIAL RIGHT 
 
Many cases involve more than a claim of contract breach.  And 
evidence may be relevant to more than one cause of action, with some 
evidence unique to one claim or defense, and other evidence relevant 
to more than one of those. Therefore, trial management, and 
specifically when to empanel a jury, requires not only the analysis 
discussed above but an evaluation of all claims and defenses. 
 
3.5.1 California’s ‘Equity First’ Rule 
 
As opposed to federal practice,149 in state courts where there are 
claims triable to both a judge and a jury, usually the judge goes first, 
and the judge’s findings are binding on the jury. If the jury goes first, 
its findings are binding on the judge. The judge’s ruling on what for 
 
 149. Hoopes v. Dolan, 168 Cal. App .4th 146, 158 (2008), citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).  This means that state cases which rely on federal caselaw 
are suspect, such as the intermediate appellate opinion which was reversed in Nationwide 
Biweekly and perhaps cases such as Mendoza v. Ruesga, 169 Cal. App. 4th 270, 284–285 
(2008). 
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convenience we will call ‘equitable claims’ may have the effect of 
determining the so-called ‘legal claims’ (those decided by a jury), so 
that there is no need for a jury trial, or only for a very limited one.150 
 
3.5.2 Basic Approach To Jury Right 
 
First, one decides if the legislature has created a right to a jury. If 
so, that governs. If not, one turns to the state constitutional test in 
Nationwide Biweekly Administration,151 to which the balance of this 
discussion is devoted. 
 
3.5.2.1 Some False Starts 
 
First, an aside: some lawyers have argued that all issues of “fact” 
are for the jury, in contrast to issues of “law” which are for the judge. 
That is a terrible argument; no court has adopted it, despite its 
superficial charm (and apparent invocation of Ev. C. § 312).152 
At the simplest level, we may, as suggested above, say that legal 
actions (or “actions at law”) are entitled to a jury, and equitable 
actions are not.153 But this distinction is useless. Equity principles are 
alive in claims both for the jury and claims which go to the judge.154  
The terminology can however be helpful as shorthand for a conclusion 
that a claim goes to the jury or the judge. 
Sometimes courts look to what relief is sought: is it money—in 
which case the claim is legal, and for the jury—or is it equitable, such 
as an injunction, or declaratory relief—in which case it is for the 
judge. But this isn’t determinative either.155 
 
 150. Nwosu v. Uba, 122 Cal. App .4th 1229, 1242 (2004); Nationwide Biweekly 
Admin., Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cty., 9 Cal. 5th 279, 317 (2020) (“This general ‘equity 
first preference’ is a long-standing feature of California law”).  See Hoopes v. Dolan, 168 
Cal. App. at 157; see also Rincon EV Realty LLC v CP III Rincon Towers, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 
5th 988, 993 (2019). 
 151. Nationwide Biweekly Admin. Inc., 9 Cal. 5th 279 (2020). 
 152. Kim v. Yi, 139 Cal. App. 4th 543, 548 (2006); Hodge v. Super. Ct., 145 Cal. App. 
4th 278, 287 (2006). 
 153. Van de Kamp v. Bank of Am., 204 Cal. App. 3d 819, 863 (1988), citing e.g., C & K 
Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 9 (1978) (action at law or an action in 
equity); Nmsbpcsldhb v. Cty of Fresno, 152 Cal. App. 4th 954, 960 (2007) (issue is whether 
the claim is an “action at law or an action in equity”). 
 154. Jogani v. Sup. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 909 (2008). 
 155. Walton v. Walton, 31 Cal. App. 4th 277, 287 (1995); C & K Eng’g Contractors, 23 
Cal. 3d at10 (request for money damages doesn’t make the claim legal); Entin v. Super. 
Ct., 208 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (2012) (request for declaratory relief doesn’t necessarily 
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3.5.2.2 Historical Test 
 
The test is an historical one: if the claim had a right to a jury in 
1850 when the state’s constitution went in to effect, it has one now; if 
not, then not. This is sometimes phrased a bit differently, which is 
whether there was a right at “common law;” it is supposed to mean 
the same thing.156 This seems like a simple historical quest, but it is 
not because often one must make analogies between claims and 
defenses in use today and those in effect in 1850, and decide if the 
“gist” of the two sets of claims are the same or not.157  This is a review 
of whether the two sets are in the same “class” or have the same 
“nature.”158  So if the “gist” is legal, there’s a right to a jury.159 But no, 
just because the “gist” is legal, as it happens, is not enough to 
conclude that there is a right to a jury.160 
 
3.5.2.3  Subsumed Legal Claims 
 
Here is a nice twist. In a case with which I have some familiarity, 
the trial and appellate courts decided that an interpleader action 
(where the court decides among claims of multiple parties to some 
asset lodged with the court, apportioning the asset to the parties) 
there is no jury entitlement. This is so even though the claims of the 
parties, such as contract rights, which are subsumed by the 
interpleader action, are otherwise entitled to a jury.161  Similarly B&P 
§ 17200 claims, which are tried to the judge, will enable all the 
 
make the claim equitable for the judge); Caira v. Offner, 126 Cal. App. 4th 12, 39 (2005) 
(“request for punitive damages did not convert her equitable shareholder derivative claim 
into a legal claim on which Laurens would be entitled to a jury trial”). 
 156. DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 153 Cal. App. 4th 150, 178 (2007); Wisden v. Super Ct., 
124 Cal. App. 4th 750, 760 (2004).   It is vague when courts say that they look to how claims 
were handled at “common law” as opposed to the more precise test, which is how they 
were handled as of 1850.  The “common law” as a body of law goes back to something 
like the fourteenth century, e.g., David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 
1700, 61 IND. L. J. 539, 592 n. 26 (1986), and the term ‘common law’ has seven different 
senses.  BRYAN GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE, 179 (3d ed. 2011).  This 
is discussed in Section 1 of this note. 
 157. DiPirro, 153 Cal. App. 4th at 179. 
 158. Id. at 179-180. 
 159. Brown v. Mortensen, 30 Cal. App. 5th 931, 942 (2019). 
 160. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 1006, 1011 (2011) (“However, it is a 
general proposition, not an absolute rule, that the right to a jury trial attaches when the 
“gist” of the action is legal,” citing C & K Eng’g Contractors.) 
 161. Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon, 167 Cal. App. 4th 1489, 1514 (2008). 
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predicate causes of action on which the § 17200 claim is founded, such 
as fraud, Labor Code violations, etc., tried to the judge even if, 
separately when not a predicate for § 17200 liability, they would be 
entitled to a jury.162  Thus when a plaintiff loses on a § 17200 claim 
because the judge decides none of the legal claims (such as e.g., 
breaches of contract, fraud, and slander of title) has merit, this finally 
disposes of those legal claims and they are not tried to a jury.163 
Suffice it to say that every single test proposed to decide if there 
is a constitutional right to a jury has its exceptions. This is worrying, 
because we’re talking about the fundamental right to a jury, and 
getting this issue wrong (denying a jury when there is a right to one) 
is reversible error, without regard to any showing of “prejudice.”164 
 
3.5.3 Current Law 
 
3.5.3.1 Majority Opinion 
 
Our Supreme Court recently decided Nationwide Biweekly.165  This 
decides that certain statutes did not have a statutory right to a jury; it 
reversed an appellate opinion which had relied on federal authority 
including the federal Seventh Amendment; and most importantly for 
our purposes it outlined how to decide if a claim has a constitutional 
right to a jury determination. Three of the seven justices concurred in 
the opinion—Justices Kruger, Liu and Cuéllar. (Below, I will return 
to that concurrence.) 
The Court confirmed the historical approach based on how 
things were in 1850.166 It confirmed the “like nature” and “the same 
class” approach in figuring out if an 1850 claim is sufficiently similar 
 
 162. Hodge v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. App. 4th 278, 284 (2006). 
 163. Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 5th 988, 995 
(2019).  So it is that plaintiffs may be put to the hard choice of keeping their § 17200 claim 
to obtain an injunction or attorney’s fees under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1021.5 (Deering 2021), 
Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 4th 1158, 1179 (2002), but losing 
the jury; or dismissing the §17200 claim in order to retain the jury right. 
 164. E.g., Guttman v. Chiazor, 15 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 57, 66 (2017); Mackovska v. 
Viewcrest Road Prop. LLC, 40 Cal. App. 5th 1, 15 (2019). 
 165. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 9 Cal. 
5th 279 (2020). 
 166. Id. at 315. 
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to the one at issue now.167  It confirmed the “gist” test.168  We can 
extract these factors for that test: 
• Do prior cases suggest the claims are equitable;169 
• Is the bulk of relief equitable;170 
• In deciding remedies, does the court have broad discretion 
over many factors, the sort of work judges and not juries do;171 
and, closely related, 
• Are there expansive and broadly worded substantive 
standards which call for the exercise of the flexibility and 
judicial expertise and experience that was traditionally 
applied by a court of equity. 172 
I would add another practical factor, a function of the last two factors.  
The fact that model jury instructions exist doesn’t always mean the 
issue is tried to a jury.173  But one should consider whether one can 
fashion adequate jury instructions, or whether, on the other hand, the 
issues to be decided “depend upon skills and wisdom acquired 
through years of study, training and experience which are not 
susceptible of adequate transmission through instructions to a lay 
jury.”174  This seems an excellent way to test the proposition that the 
jury can decide the matter: if proposed instructions are so vague that 
many sets of conflicting facts can all permit a verdict for either the 
plaintiff or the defendant, the issue is probably not for the jury. 
So there it is, a “gist” test based on 4 or 5 factors, extracted from 
the classic California’s “historical” approach to whether there’s a 
right to a jury.  Only future cases will tell if Nationwide Biweekly 
provides more practical guidance than earlier decisions.175 
Of course, if it’s clear that the claim today is the same as one in 
1850 which was entitled to a jury, one need not deal with the 
 
 167. Id. at 316 
 168. Id. at 322. 
 169. Id. at 324. 
 170. Id. at 326. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 327. 
 173. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. McAfee, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 292, 350 (2017). 
 174. Hoopes v. Dolan, 168 Cal. App. 4th 146, 155–156 (2008) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 175. We can expect courts to disagree on the applications of these factors, just as the 
U.S. Supreme Court, engaged in a similar historical quest, has split on whether a cause of 
action today is more similar to an old common law legal claim or equitable claim.  
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), discussed 
in e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can 
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L. J. 852, 880 (2013). 
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Nationwide Biweekly list of factors. The historical inquiry alone may be 
enough to show that the claim was entitled to a jury as of 1850, as it 
is with contract and quantum meruit.176 
The test, then, can be seen as having two branches, either 
sufficient: the simple one is to see if the claim was tried to the jury in 
1850 (like a contract claim).  If that doesn’t work, e.g., because the 
current claim seems to have both equitable and legal aspects, or it’s 
not clear how to analogize the current claim to claims extant in 1850, 
we shift to the gist test.  The first, simple, test is arbitrary, in the sense 
that it simply sorts claims without regard to whether juries or judges 
are best suited to handling them. For example, it seems arbitrary that 
promissory estoppel is for a judge and quasi-contract is for the jury.  
And the allocation is made, for example, of equitable and implied 
indemnity, and quasi-contract, to juries, although the cases are clear 
that equitable principles are in play.177  The gist test, on the other 
hand, does attend to the respective strengths of the judge and jury. 
 
3.5.3.2 The Concurrence 
 
As mentioned, Justice Kruger joined by two other justices filed a 
concurrence in the judgment.178  She agreed that one of the statutes at 
issue had no right to a jury. But regarding the second one, the False 
Advertising Law (“FAL,” B&P 17500), she both agreed with the 
majority that in this case there was no right to a jury, but, in 
disagreeing with the majority, wrote there might be a right to a jury 
in other cases because the FAL claim is not “inherently equitable.”179  
 
 176. Jogani v. Super. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 906–907 (2008).  It’s clear today that 
contract claims are ‘legal’ and in that sense entitled to a jury.  E.g., Note, The Right to A 
Jury Trial in A Stockholder’s Derivative Action, 74 YALE L. J. 725, 727 (165); Jay Tidmarsh, The 
English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial, 83U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1941 
n.28 (2016).  I discuss the history of contract claims in section 1, but here we should recall 
that the nature of contract has shifted radically over the centuries, and that early on it was 
the courts of Chancery (whence our equity jurisdiction) that handled contract claims, 
deciding for example to “enforce unsealed written promises and oral promises.”  Note, 
The Right to A Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. J. REV. 1176, 1182 (1961).  And the period right 
around the key date we use in this state to decide what sorts of claims have a right to a 
jury--1850, the mid-nineteenth century--saw profound changes in contract law.  See 
generally, Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. 
L. REV.  917 (1974); Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 STAN. L. REV. 753, 765–
766 (1981), reviewing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
 177. E.g., Jogani, 165 Cal. App. at  909. 
 178. Nationwide Biweekly Admin. Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cty., 9 Cal. 5th 279, 
.334 ff. 
 179. Id. at 341. 
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This sort of parsing presents difficult issues for trial judges and 
lawyers, because they would have to entertain a new set of criteria to 
decide what to do in each succeeding FAL case. The distinction 
between “inherently” equitable claims and what we might call 
potentially equitable claims does not seem to be found in precedent. 
The new set of criteria the minority opinion cites are these: in this 
specific case, “trying liability under the FAL to the jury, while the rest 
of the action was decided by the court, would create procedural 
complications without significant benefit to the defendant 
demanding jury trial,”180 and in this case if the other equitable claims 
were tried first, the final result “would be determined by the trial 
court on the basis of equitable principles, allowing the court to all but 
nullify any jury finding of an FAL violation. What is more, the court 
could effectively override any jury decision against FAL liability by 
imposing liability for the same conduct under the UCL before the 
FAL issue is ever tried . . .”181 
This is odd. We can understand Justice Kruger’s view that the 
FAL claim was for the jury—she makes a good argument on that, 
although the majority obviously disagreed.  But she concludes that 
the FAL claim is not for the jury if, under California’s ‘equity first’ 
rule, the FAL claim is in effect decided by the judge’s ruling on e.g., 
the concededly equitable UCL claim.  But I have seen no other case 
where the fact that a legal claim might be obviated by an earlier ruling 
on an equitable claim means the legal claim is transmuted into an 
equitable claim; rather, it’s just a legal claim that need not be tried.182 
Practically it’s difficult to know where to go with the minority’s 
approach. When deciding whether to handle legal and equitable 
claims one after the other, or together, the judge usually first figures 
out which ones are legal (and get a jury) and which are equitable (and 
don’t get a jury), and tries to muddle along from there; but under 
Justice Kruger’s reasoning, the judge could decide the order of trial 
first, thereby changing a legal claim into an equitable one, and so 
justifying a decision to have the judge trial first, and then expressly 
deciding what had been a legal (jury) claim. 
 
3.6 WAIVER OF JURY RIGHT 
 
 
 180. Id. at 342. 
 181. Id. 
 182. E.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 5th 988, 
995 (2019). 
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No matter how bad or sloppy a party’s behavior, there are 
exactly 6 ways a right to a jury can be waived, and they are listed in 
CCP § 631 (f): 
 
(1) By failing to appear at the trial. 
(2) By written consent filed with the clerk or judge. 
(3) By oral consent, in open court, entered in the 
minutes. 
(4) By failing to announce that a jury is required, at the 
time the cause is first set for trial, if it is set upon notice 
or stipulation, or within five days after notice of 
setting if it is set without notice or stipulation. 
(5) By failing to timely pay the fee described in 
subdivision (b), unless another party on the same side 
of the case has paid that fee. 
(6) By failing to deposit with the clerk or judge, at the 
beginning of the second and each succeeding day’s 
session, the sum provided in subdivision (e). 
 
CCP § 631(f).  No other action or inaction waives a jury.183  A 
concession in an opposition to a motion regarding the right to a jury 
doesn’t squarely fit in one of these categories, so it doesn’t waive a 
jury.184  A “failure to submit jury instructions within the specified 
time” cannot be a waiver of a jury.185  And so for example, a “pre-
dispute” agreement, say in an employment agreement that purports 
to waive a jury, is ineffective.186  But all this is within the context of 
court proceedings; in what could be seen as a loophole, agreements 
to arbitrate—which of course imply a waiver of a jury, and are most 
often pre-dispute agreements—are usually valid.187 
 
3.7 RELIEF FROM WAIVER OF A JURY 
 
 
 183. Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc., 8 Cal. App. 5th 1, 12–13 
(2017). 
 184. DiPirro v. Bondo Corp., 153 Cal. App. 4th 150, 177 (2007). 
 185. Chen v. Lin, 42 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 12, 17 (2019). 
 186. Handoush v. Lease Fin. Grp., LLC, 41 Cal. App. 5th 729, 736 (2019). 
 187. O’Donoghue v. Super. Ct., 219 Cal. App. 4th 245, 256–257 (2013); Lange v. 
Monster Energy Co., 46 Cal. App. 5th 436, 452 (2020) (distinguishing waiver of jury in 
court setting from waiver of jury inherent in arbitration agreement). 
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Not only are there strict requirements for waiver of a jury trial, 
but when there are such waivers, trial courts are encouraged to set 
the waiver aside on request of the party seeking the jury.  The only 
basis to resist such a request is a demonstration that granting the relief 
will prejudice the other side.188  A showing that the jury trial, as such, 
will “prejudice” the other side (e.g. that the party expects to do better 
with a judge than a jury, or that a jury trial takes longer) doesn’t 
count.189  What counts is something like a showing that the other side 
had prepared for a court trial and was demonstrably unprepared for 
a jury trial; or had undertaken discovery in contemplation of a court 
trial that differed markedly from what one would do for a jury trial. 
Perhaps a party might be prejudiced if it had to develop complex and 
time-consuming motions in limine, or exhibits which were 
exceedingly time-consuming to prepare (and useful for a jury and not 
a judge).190  Older cases stating that “relief will be denied where the 
only reason for the [new jury] demand appears to be the party’s 
change of mind,”191 
may not be good law where there is no prejudice.  Also, old law 
held that denial of jury had to be shown on appeal to have 
“prejudiced” the party entitled to a jury in order to secure a reversal. 
That is no longer true: an erroneous denial of a jury alone results in 
reversal.192 
 
3.8 CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WITH A RIGHT TO A JURY 
 
Managing a trial with contract claims requires an investigation 
into the other claims and defenses at issue, and arranging the trial 
with the appropriate and efficient submissions to the jury.  Absent 
agreement among the parties, the trial judge may have to decide 
which claims have a right to a jury and which do not. When some 
 
 188. Mackovska v. Viewcrest Rd. Props. LLC, 40 Cal. App. 5th 1, 10 (2019). 
 189. Gann v. Williams Bros. Realty, Inc., 231 Cal. App. 3d 1698, 1704 (1991); Winston 
v. Super. Ct., 196 Cal. App. 3d 600, 603 (1987). 
 190. Johnson-Stovall v. Super. Ct., 17 Cal. App. 4th 808, 811 (1993).  See also Gonzales 
v. Nork, 20 Cal.3d 500, 508 (1978); McIntosh v. Bowman, 151 Cal. App. 3d 357, 363 (1984) 
(prejudice where calling a jury would lead to “continuance … entailing more costs and 
inconvenience of witnesses,” a threat of dismissal for the delay, and delay would cause 
financial distress). 
 191. O’Donoghue, 219 Cal. App. 4th at 256–257; Lange v. Monster Energy Co., 46 Cal. 
App. 5th 436, 452 (2020) (distinguishing waiver of jury in court setting from waiver of jury 
inherent in arbitration agreement). 
 192. Mackovska v. Viewcrest Rd. Props. LLC, 40 Cal. App. 5th 1, 16 (2019). 
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issues are entitled to a jury (e.g. contract) and others are not, the trial 
judge must consider how to stagger the presentations of evidence.  
This is discussed below under “Sorting the trial.” 
Trial judges are of course bound by appellate decisions, and if a 
case says a claim had a right to a jury in 1850, then that’s the way it 
is. But for many claims, the historical record is in truth more fluid.193  
Some of the case authority listed below is dated, and some may have 
used analyses which are not strictly speaking the same as used by our 
Supreme Court in Nationwide Biweekly.  So in the future, not all these 
rulings may hold up. 
Below, ‘equitable’ denotes claims triable to the judge, and ‘legal’ 




• Declaratory Relief: Depends.195  While these actions are often 
equitable, if they are “in effect used as a substitute for an 
action at law for breach of contract,” they are legal and a jury 
is warranted.196  This can be a “difficult” inquiry.197 
• Restitution: Depends. Thought of as a type or measure of 
recovery, and not a cause of action, restitution may call for 
either jury or not. So, restitution under the False Advertising 
Law (FAL) and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) doesn’t 
require a jury, but sought as a remedy for a legal claim would 
entitle the plaintiff to a jury.198 
 
 193. E.g., Fleming James, Jr., Right to A Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 658 
ff. (1963); Jay Tidmarsh, The English Fire Courts and the American Right to Civil Jury Trial, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1893, 1899-1941 & n.26 (2016) (referring to “the fluidity of jury trial 
practices in eighteenth-century England”). 
 194. The reader should also consult the lists found at WILLIAM E. WEGNER, ET AL., 
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE—CIVIL TRIALS AND EVIDENCE § 2:78.1 ff. (2019); CALIFORNIA 
JUDGES BENCHBOOK: CIVIL PROCEEDINGS, TRIAL §§ 3.3, 3.4 (2017). 
 195. Hoopes v. Dolan, 168 Cal. App. 4th 146, 159 n.1 (2008). 
 196. Entin v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 4th 770, 779 (2012) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
 197. Nwosu v. Uba, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1241.  See Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Grp. 
Staffing Co., Inc., 54 Cal. App. 5th 670 2020 WL 5525180 at *12 (Sept. 15, 2020) (declaratory 
relief for ownership of certain property, similar to replevin, may be legal, but where 
ownership but not possession is at issue, action is equitable). 
 198. Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 699 n.24 (2006); 
Jogani v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 910 (2008); Am. Master Lease LLC v. 
Idanta Partners, Ltd., 225 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1484 (2014). 
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• Equitable or implied indemnity: Legal.199 
• Promissory Estoppel: Equitable.200 
• Money had and received, common count: Legal.201 
• Specific performance: Equitable.202 
• Quiet Title: Equitable.203 
• Quasi Contract: Legal;204 even though based on equitable 
principles.205 The court’s logic in Franchise Tax Bd206 strongly 
suggests a jury trial.  See unjust enrichment. 
• Unjust Enrichment: Likely legal.  The doctrine may not really 
be a cause of action; it is a type of remedy, or perhaps better 
put, “it is a general principle underlying various doctrines 
and remedies, including quasi-contract,”207 strongly 
suggesting there is a jury right. Quasi contract can be a claim 
for unjust enrichment,208 and there is a right to jury trial on 
unjust enrichment claims.209 
• Constructive Trust: Equitable.210 
• Rescission: Depends. “[I]f a rescission action seeking to recover 
something other than the consideration paid was an equitable 
action prior to the 1961 amendments, then it is an equitable 
action today.”211 
• Accounting: Equitable.212 
 
 199. Martin v. Cty. of L.A., 51 Cal. App. 4th 688, 698 (1996) (legal, even though 
equitable principles involved) (case perhaps inappropriately seems to rely on federal 
authority under the Seventh Amendment, but the case was cited with approval in 
Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Super. Ct. of Alameda Cty., 9 Cal.5th 279, 318 
(2020)). 
 200. Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 4th 230, 243–244 
(2012); C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 11 (1978). 
 201. Nwosu v. Uba, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1241 (2004). 
 202. Caira v. Offner, 126 Cal. App. 4th 12, 27 (2005); Nwosu, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 1240. 
 203. Nwosu, 122 Cal. App. at1241. 
 204. Id. at 1241. 
 205. Welborne v. Ryman-Carroll Found., 22 Cal. App. 5th 719, 728 n.8 (2018). 
 206. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 1006, 1017 (2011). 
 207. Jogani v. Super. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 901, 911 (2008). 
 208. Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 548 (1966). 
 209. Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank, 77 Cal. App. 4th 723 (2000). 
 210. Getty v. Getty, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1159, 1177 (1986). 
 211. Nmsbpcsldhb v. Cty. of Fresno, 152 Cal. App. 4th 954, 963 (2007).  “We conclude 
that the action is equitable because it seeks something other than a return of the 
consideration given by NMS.”  Id. at 966. 
 212. De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482 (1997); Van de 
Kamp v. Bank of Am., 204 Cal. App. 3d 819, 865 (1988). 
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• Quantum Meruit: Legal.213 
• Assumpsit: Legal.  This is an old form of quantum meruit,214 
similar to a common counts for money had and received.215  
The court’s logic in Franchise Tax Bd216 strongly suggests a jury 
trial. 
• Covenant of good faith and fair dealing: Probably legal. The 
“covenant is a contract term,”217 so it is likely for the jury.  The 
issue is commonly given to the jury, but in the cases cited here 
the issue of a right to a jury is not decided.218 But compare 
Benach where the issue was for the judge.219 
• Breach Fiduciary Duty: This may depend. There are various 
sorts of fiduciary duties,220and some might be triable to a jury; 
but at least those that attend to the duties dependent on 
corporate ownership are triable to the court.  It doesn’t matter 
if money damages are sought,221 and two cases that so hold 
(Central Laborers’ Pension and Interactive Multimedia) were 
cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Nationwide 
Biweekly.222  Compare, City of Hope and other cases.223 
• Alter ego: Equitable.224  This isn’t a cause of action, but, like 
conspiracy or other theories of vicarious liability, a means to 
hold one party liable for the wrongs of another. 
 
 213. Jogani v. Super. Ct., 165 Cal. App. 4th 901 (2008) [as an example of quasi contract]; 
Nwosu v. Uba, 122 Cal. App. 4th 1229, 1241 (2004); Chodos v. Borman, 227 Cal. App. 4th 
76, 97 (2014); see Maglica v. Maglica, 66 Cal. App. 4th 442, 448 (1998) (jury assumed). 
 214. Jogani, 165 Cal. App. 4th at 905. 
 215. Philpott v. Super. Ct. in & for L.A. Cty., 1 Cal. 2d 512, 517 (1934). 
 216. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 1006, 1017 (2011). 
 217. Kransco v. Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 390, 400 (2000). 
 218. E.g., Thompson Pac. Constr., Inc. v. City of Sunnyvale, 155 Cal. App. 4th 525, 534 
(2007); Kransco, 23 Cal. 4th at 398. 
 219. Benach v. Cty. of L.A., 149 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846–47 (2007) (no jury right because 
the “gist” of the claim was for specific performance). 
 220. Hodges v. Cty. of Placer, 41 Cal. App. 5th 537, 547 (2019). 
 221. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v. McAfee, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 292, 347 (2017); 
Interactive Multimedia Artists, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 62 Cal. App. 4th 1546, 1556 (1998); 
Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 122 (1999). 
 222. See also, e.g., Nelson v. Anderson, 72 Cal. App. 4th 111, 122 (1999). 
 223. City of Hope Nat’l Med. Ctr. v. Genentech, Inc., 43 Cal.4th 375, 394 (2008) (breach 
of fiduciary duty tried to jury, but issue not raised on appeal); Pellegrini v. Weiss, 165 Cal. 
App. 4th 515, 531 (2008) (same); Eng v. Brown, 21 Cal. App. 5th 675, 691 n.4 (2018) (same); 
Middlesex Ins. Co. v. Mann, 124 Cal. App. 3d 558, 566 (1981) (breach of fiduciary duty 
goes to jury). 
 224. Dow Jones Co. v. Avenel, 151 Cal. App. 3d 144, 147 (1984). 
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• Shareholder derivative claims: Equitable.225 




3.8.2.1 In General 
 
Most authorities divide defenses into those which are legal and 
those which are equitable, with the concomitant right of trial for the 
legal ones. “Equitable defenses are tried to the judge alone; the 
judge’s findings may well obviate a jury trial on remaining legal 
issues, without abridging the right to a jury trial.”227  “Generally, 
equitable defenses are tried by the judge alone even though other 
issues in the action are ‘legal’ in nature and hence determined by the 
jury.”228 
The Code of Civil Procedure expressly allows the bifurcation and 
earlier trial of many defenses such as those which might bar a claim.229 
There is one troublesome case in this area, Unilogic,230 which 
reads, 
 
The gist of Unilogic’s action for conversion was legal. 
Burroughs simply asserted an affirmative defense of 
unclean hands. As the court observed in Ford v. 
Superior Court (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 754, 1 Cal.Rptr. 
559, in which defendants asserted seven affirmative 
equitable defenses, including unclean hands, to an 
action at law for breach of contract: “The assertion of 
such defenses in a law action will not change it to an 
action in equity or warrant separate and prior trial by 
the court.” (Id.at p. 759, 1 Cal.Rptr. 559.)” 
 
This of course suggests that equitable defenses (here, unclean 
hands) to legal claims go to the jury.  I discuss this case below under 
 
 225. Caira v. Offner, 126 Cal. App. 4th 12, 38–39 (2005). 
 226. Moofly Prods., LLC v. Favila, 46 Cal. App. 5th 1, 10 (2020). 
 227. Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal. App. 4th 736, 763 (2007); De 
Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482, 506 (1997). 
 228. WILLIAM E. WEGNER, ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE--CIVIL TRIALS AND 
EVIDENCE § 2:254 ff. (2019). 
 229. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 597. 
 230. Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 10 Cal. App. 4th 612, 622 (1992). 
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“Sorting the Trial,” where I suggest that the issue is of trial 
management, not a rule that actually mandates the submission of 
equitable defenses to a jury. 
 
3.8.2.2 Specific Defenses 
 
For a general list of defenses to contract claims, most of which 
are legal, see e.g., 5 B. Witkin, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Pleadings § 
1088 (2020); and many others are cited in e.g. 1 B. Witkin, SUMMARY 
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts, passim (2020) such as accord and 
satisfaction, novation, impossibility and so on. 
• Equitable Estoppel: Equitable. 231 
• Unconscionability: Probably equitable. The statute commits 
the issue to the court: 
 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause 
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of 
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
 
CC § 1670.5 (a). This is a good example of words used in different 
ways which can lead to confusion: the issue is “legal” in the sense that 
it is “a matter of law,”232 but that does not mean it’s “legal” as opposed 
to “equitable” and so for the jury.  Many cases hold the matter is for 
the judge.233  But often, this is in the context of petitions or motions to 
arbitrate which, because these are actually suits in equity for specific 
performance, would be committed to the judge, and never the jury, 
anyway.234  Note, however, e.g., U.S. Roofing235 which was not decided 
in the arbitration context. 
 
 231. Hoopes v. Dolan, 168 Cal. App. 4th 146, 155 (2008); Judicial Council of California 
v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 882, 897 (2015). 
 232. Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc., 245 Cal. App. 4th 227, 236 (2016); Jones v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, 112 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1539 (2003). 
 233. Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 851 (2001); Vance v. 
Villa Park Mobilehome Estates, 36 Cal. App. 4th 698, 709 (1995); Patterson v. ITT 
Consumer Financial Corp., 14 Cal.App.4th 1659, 1663 (1993); De Guere v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482, 504 n.5 (1997). 
 234. Metis Development LLC v. Bohacek, 200 Cal. App. 4th 679, 688 (2011). 
 235. U.S. Roofing, Inc. v. Credit All. Corp., 228 Cal. App. 3d 1431, 1448 (1991). 
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Unconscionability issues seem difficult or impossible to reduce 
to jury instructions.236 “The question of unconscionability is expressly 
one of law for the court and not for the jury. It has been held that there 
is no violation of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by 
leaving the question of unconscionability to the court because the 
doctrine has its origins in equity, despite its use in various common-
law decisions.”237 
• Substantial Compliance:238 Equitable.239 
• Unclean Hands: Equitable.240 But the issue has been sent to the 
jury in some cases.241  Some cases note that the “defense is 
available in legal as well as equitable actions,”242 but this 
doesn’t directly answer the question whether the matter is for 
a judge or a jury. 
• Illegal penalty: Equitable.243 
• Equitable tolling: Equitable.244 
• In pari delicto: Equitable. 245 
 
 236. E.g., De La Torre v. CashCall, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 966, 976 (2018) (“Unconscionability is 
a flexible standard in which the court looks not only at the complained-of term but also at 
the process by which the contractual parties arrived at the agreement and the larger 
context surrounding the contract, including its ‘commercial setting, purpose, and effect.’); 
Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 89, 108 (2011) (court looks to “factors … which, 
under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it 
[unenforceable].’). 
 237. HOWARD HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 19:40 (2020) (note omitted). 
 238. Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 882, 913 
(2015) (“To demonstrate substantial compliance, a contractor must show it was licensed 
prior to performing, acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain its license, was 
unaware of any failure of licensure upon commencement of performance, and acted 
promptly and in good faith to reinstate its license upon learning it was invalid.”); see C. 
W. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Carpenter, 53 Cal. App. 5th 165 at *2 (2020). 
 239. Judicial Council of California, 239 Cal. App. 4th at 914. 
 240. Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, 133 Cal. 
App. 4th 658, 679 (2005). 
 241. E.g., Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 10 Cal. App. 4th 612 (1992); Mattco Forge, 
Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 Cal. App. 4th 820, 846 (1997); see Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. 
v. McKenzie, 88 Cal. App. 4th 681, 688 n.3 (2001). 
 242. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 4th 970, 978 (2000); 
CrossTalk Prods., Inc. v. Jacobson, 65 Cal. App. 4th 631, 647 (1998). 
 243. Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress for Less, Inc., 232 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 
1354 (2015). 
 244. Hopkins v. Kedzierski, 225 Cal. App. 4th 736, 745–746 (2014). 
 245. Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, 133 Cal. 
App. 4th 658, 677 (2005). 
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• Forfeiture: Equitable.246 
• Statute of frauds: Unclear; may depend.  I have found no case 
that directly decides the issue.  A Supreme court opinion, C & 
K, can be read to suggest the issue is equitable, as it recites a 
list of equitable issues this way: “Ford v. Palisades Corp. (1950) 
101 Cal.App.2d 491, 498-499, 225 P.2d 545 (statute of frauds). 
. .” but this is better read as noting cases relating to estoppel, 
including estoppel to plead the statute of frauds, as triable to 
the judge.247  The cases on which C & K relies do not say the 
statute of frauds is for the judge; they do say it for estoppel.248  
As we have seen, promissory estoppel (which is a way to avoid 
the statute of frauds) is an equitable issue for the judge.249  
These are not holdings that all statute of frauds issues are for 
the judge. 
 
There are many issues which may arise under the statute of 
frauds: whether an agreement is performable within a year, the extent 
to which it is in writing, whether it’s for real property, the sum of 
money involved, whether a “qualified financial contract” exists, and 
so on. It may be that some of these involve jury issues and others do 
not.  For example, with respect to the issue of whether we have an 
“agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from 
the making thereof,”250 the issue may depend, first, on ascertaining 
the meaning of the agreement: what, exactly, are its terms?  The 
identity of the fact finder charged with the eventual resolution of the 
statute of frauds (when CC § 1624 (a)(1) is in play) may thus depend 
on the resolution of whether the judge or the jury decides the 
meaning of the oral contract. 
 
 246. Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 882, 897 
(2015). 
 247. C & K Eng’g Contractors v. Amber Steel Co., 23 Cal. 3d 1, 9–10 (1978). 
 248. Ford v. Palisades Corp., 101 Cal. App. 2d 491, 499 (1950), relying on Sellers v. 
Solway Land Co., 31 Cal. App. 259 (1916); Halsey v. Robinson, 19 Cal. 2d 476, 482 (1942).  
See also Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 608 (1966); Price v. McConnell, 184 
Cal. App. 2d 660, 667 (1960); 101 A.L.R. 185 (issue of “part performance which will take a 
contract out of the Statute of Frauds is cognizable only in equity”). 
 249. E.g., Douglas E. Barnhart, Inc. v. CMC Fabricators, Inc., 211 Cal. App. 4th 230, 
243–244 (2012); C & K Eng’g Contractors, 23 Cal. 3d 1 at 11. 
 250. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624 (a)(1). 
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In oral agreements, there is no question of construing a writing, 
nor thus of the respective roles of judge and jury in determining 
written meaning.251 
 
3.9 SORTING THE TRIAL 
 
Once the issues discussed above are mapped out and the judge 
finds out what is disputed, the judge can decide how to arrange the 
trial. I suggest the judge will consider bifurcation, phasing, and other 
techniques so as to minimize: 
• the total days of trial, 
• the number of times the same evidence has to be presented, 
• the number of times a non-party witness must make a personal 
appearance (separate reading from deposition transcripts 
don’t count), 
• the number of days the jury will be in court, 
• gaps in the days of jury service, and 
• risk of inconsistent findings—the judge must consider the 
impact of findings by one fact finder (jury or judge) on the 
other (judge or jury) when there are both legal and equitable 
claims or defenses. 
 
I also suggest that the arrangement should favor, as far as is 
reasonably convenient, the determination of legal issues by the jury 
and equitable issues by the judge, that is, to avoid a situation where 
one fact finder in effect obviates the role of the other. 
The parties may have some very good ideas on how to sort the 
trial with these interests in mind.  But left to their own devices, 
lawyers will not brief the issues this way. Each side has an abiding 
interest in a jury, or judge, trial; so each will arrange his or her 
argument to generate that result. So a lawyer who hopes for a jury 
will explain how the equitable issues either must, or in the court’s 
discretion can, be submitted to the jury, or how after the jury has 
 
 251. Compare Brawthen v. H & R Block, Inc., 28 Cal. App. 3d 131, 137 (1972) (jury hears 
evidence of what the oral contact was); Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 243, 259 (1924) 
(same); San Francisco Brewing Corp. v. Bowman, 52 Cal. 2d 607, 613 (1959) (same); Smyth 
v. Tennison, 24 Cal. App. 519, 521 (1914) (“since the contract was oral, its interpretation in 
the first instance was a question of fact to be determined by the jury; but, since such 
interpretation was clearly erroneous, it became the duty of the trial court, upon 
application therefor, to set the verdict aside”); with Fed. R. Evid. § 310 (judge decides 
meaning of writings). 
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ruled, the judge’s task will be so much easier and simpler, perhaps 
because the judge is then bound by a jury verdict. The side that hopes 
for a judge trial will discuss the benefits of a quick, streamlined bench 
trial, the difficult legal issues only a wise judge can handle, and the 
likelihood that the time and costs of a jury trial, and the concomitant 
impositions on the public, will be avoided after the judge has ruled in 
that side’s favor, in effect obliterating the legal (jury) claims. The fact 
is that a trial can often be arranged one way or the other, jury or judge 
first, with at least the possibility that the second phase will be 
truncated or eliminated. But while these sorts of arguments from 
counsel will be interesting, they may not address the factors to be 
decided: the most practical approach, retaining as much to the judge, 
or jury, as appropriate. Those are, I suggest, the bullet-point factors 
listed just above. 
 
3.9.1 The Unilogic Problem 
 
As noted, Unilogic252 can be read to block the judge’s 
consideration of some equitable defenses when the case is in the main 
legal and thus submitted to the jury. 
Now, other authority makes it clear that having submitted an 
issue to one fact finder (say, the jury), the next fact finder (say, the 
judge) is bound by the first findings. So, for example, it is routine to 
note that the judge—having decided equitable issues—may have 
decided the material legal issues too, leaving nothing for the jury.  So 
a judge could decide an issue; then empanel a jury; or the judge could 
hear the evidence at the same time as the jury and decide before the 
jury does; or allow the jury to decide legal issues and then decide the 
equitable issues, either independently (because the verdict is 
independent of the equitable issues) or as bound by the verdict 
(because the verdict tied the judge’s hands on a decisive issue).  In 
Unilogic, it seems, the jury’s decision on the legal issues would bind 
the consideration of the equitable defenses.253  So far so good. 
What is troubling, though, is the suggestion that the trial judge 
did not have the power to decide the equitable defenses first.  Unilogic 
quotes another case to the effect that the “assertion of such defenses 
in a law action will not . . . warrant separate and prior trial by the 
 
 252. Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 10 Cal. App. 4th 612, 622 (1992). 
 253. Id. at 623. 
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court.”254 The quote is accurate, but unexplained and unsupported, 
and may conflict with CCP § 597 and the usual power of the trial 
judge to order proceedings.255 
Breaking with my rule to cite only published cases, I note that 
others read Unilogic to suggest, at most, only that the trial judge had 
discretion to send the defenses to the jury: 
 
Notwithstanding this dicta, Unilogic cannot be read to 
stand for the proposition that Burroughs had a right to 
a jury trial on its equitable defense. The Unilogic court 
stated that,” the trial court has discretion whether to 
submit an equitable defense to the jury,” and that the 
trial court had not abused its discretion in submitting 
the matter to the jury. 
 
La Jolla Cove Motel and Hotel Apartments, Inc. v. Jackman, 2006 WL 
401268, at *6 (Feb 21, 2006). 
But a published case’s remark only increases one’s anxiety level 
on the matter: 
 
As defendants note, it has been held that courts have 
the discretion to submit an equitable defense to the 
jury when the defense “ ‘is so intertwined with legal 
claims that it cannot be separately tried to the judge.’ 
” (Unilogic, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp. (1992) 10 
Cal.App.4th 612, 623, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 741.) 
 
Judicial Council of California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc., 239 Cal.App.4th 
882, 916 (2015). This seems both to confirm the discretion noted by La 
Jolla Cove Motel, but also suggests that jury consideration of the 
equitable issues may be essential if the equitable defense cannot be 
separately tried to the judge.  The key here, perhaps, is to regard the 
phrase “so intertwined with legal claims that it cannot be separately 
tried to the judge” as a conclusion, and not an analysis; and to see the 
issue more as one of trial management. 
 
 
 254. Id. at 622, quoting Ford v. Super. Ct. In and For Sacramento Cty., 176 Cal. App. 
2d 754, 759 (1959). 
 255. See generally Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 758 
(2007) (“inherent power to control litigation”); Bate v. Marsteller, 232 Cal. App. 2d 605, 
617 (1965) (“trial court has power over the order of proof”); Fed. R. Evid. § 320. 
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3.9.2 Special Findings and Interrogatories 
I have noted that a judge may ask the jury for special findings 
which resolve credibility disputes arising from conflicting evidence, 
all in the context of determining the meaning of a contract. Of course, 
a jury may decide if a contract has been breached, other related 
claims, many classic defenses, and contract damages.256  Here, I focus 
on the jury’s role in providing special findings257 on (i) meaning and 
(ii) in connection with their verdict on legal claims and legal defenses. 
I discuss these after an aside on general issues with special findings. 
 
3.9.2.1 An Aside on General Verdicts, Special Verdicts, and Special 
Findings or Interrogatories 
 
To provide context, I note that a general verdict form simply 
declares who wins on a cause of action: the jury simply finds for 
plaintiff or defendant.  A special verdict form leads the jury through a 
series of (usually) ‘yes/no’ questions, with instructions after each as 
to which question to answer next. The questions resolve each material 
disputed fact issue necessary to generate a judgment in favor of a 
party, including damages,258 and sometimes including the specific 
type of damages (although as we’ll see next, the question which 
allocates damages can be thought of as a special interrogatory). 
Special findings, also called special interrogatories, are added to one of 
these other verdict forms in order to resolve additional questions, 
which perhaps are not, strictly speaking, needed to generate a 
judgment in the case.  Special findings can be used to assess whether 
fault is really that of a master or servant, agency, comparative fault, 
facts which will help resolve (or indeed dispose of) alter ego, coverage 
and indemnity issues, and so on.259  They might, for example, state 
expressly which of many breaches of fiduciary duty the jury found to 
be true.260  Categories or types of damages can be distinguished by 
special findings,261 and sorting damages as among claims can be 
 
 256. E.g., Monster, LLC v. Super. Ct. 12 Cal. App. 5th 1214, 1228 (2017). 
 257. The parties should propose language.  Thompson Pacific Construction, Inc. v. 
City of Sunnyvale, 155 Cal. App. 4th 525, 550–551 (2007). 
 258. Saxena v. Goffney, 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 325 (2008). 
 259. E.g., Serian Brothers, Inc. v. Agri-Sun Nursery, 25 Cal. App. 4th 306, 310 n.3 (1994) 
(findings on agency). 
 260. Kangarlou v. Progressive Title Co., Inc., 128 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1179 (2005) 
(apparently unhappy that special findings were not sought on the issue). 
 261. Pressler v. Irvine Drugs, Inc., 169 Cal. App. 3d 1244, 1249 (1985). 
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handled this way too.262  So too, findings needed to implement 
MICRA related adjustments.263  (In practice, this sort of work is also 




There are risks in the use of special verdict forms and special 
findings that do not exist with general verdict forms. The appellate 
courts will make “all reasonable inferences” in favor of a general 
verdict form.264  The jury will be deemed to have found whatever is 
necessary to support that verdict,265 which is a difficult standard of 
review for the appellant. 
With special findings, the appellate courts are more cautious: if 
the jury issued inconsistent findings, the appellate court will 
reverse.266 
With a conflict between a general verdict form and special 
findings, the appellate court will reverse for a new trial when “the 
special finding when taken by itself would authorize a judgment 
different from that which the general verdict will permit.”267 
The trial judge may be able to avert a crisis by intervening before 
the jury is discharged. It is worth the time to very, very, very carefully 
review a special verdict form, or form including special 
interrogatories, to see if there are any inconsistencies, and if there are, 
the court can have the jury further deliberate and fix “a potentially 
ambiguous or inconsistent verdict.”268 
 
3.9.2.2 Special Findings on Meaning 
 
 262. Tavaglione v. Billings, 4 Cal. 4th 1150, 1152 (1993); Plut v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. 
85 Cal. App. 4th 98, 103 (2000). 
 263. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 38 Cal. 3d 137, 157 (1985); see also, e.g., Am. Bank 
& Tr. Co. v. Cmty. Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 377 (1984). 
 264. Fuller v. Dep’t. of Transp., 38 Cal. App. 5th 1034, 1039 (2019). 
 265. Tierney v. Javaid, 24 Cal. App. 5th 99, 113 (2018). 
 266. Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc., 186 Cal. App. 4th 338, 359 (2010); see 
generally Saxena v. Goffney, 159 Cal. App. 4th 316, 325 (2008); City of San Diego v. D.R. 
Horton San Diego Holding Co., 126 Cal. App. 4th 668, 679 (2005) (contrasting deference 
given to general verdict form to scrutiny of special verdict form). 
 267. Bate v. Marsteller, 232 Cal. App. 2d 605, 614–615 (1965); Wyler v. Feuer 85 Cal. 
App. 3d 392, 404 (1978); see also City of San Diego v. D.R. Horton San Diego Holding Co., 
Inc. 126 Cal. App. 4th 668, 679 (2005) (the “general verdict will not be set aside unless there 
is no possibility of reconciling the general and special verdicts under any possible 
application of the evidence and instructions”). 
 268. Zagami, Inc. v. James A. Crone, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 4th 1083, 1091 (2008). 
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Let us return to the jury’s role in providing special findings on 
(i) meaning and (ii) in connection with their verdict on legal claims 
and legal defenses. As to (i), the judge and parties can draft up 
straightforward questions, answered with a ‘Yes/No’ response; or 
whether a fact is true; or selecting which of two meanings it finds to 
be true.  So if the issue of meaning is to return to the judge, the jury 
will be asked to state whether something is true.  If the jury is to have 
the final say on meaning, it will pick the correct one from offered 
alternatives. 
For example, suppose we agree you will tend my “vegetables.” 
The judge has been convinced that “vegetable” is reasonably 
susceptible to meanings that include, or not, tomatoes. The EE is 
expert testimony that a tomato is not in fact a vegetable; and EE to the 
effect that you and I have previously said that tomatoes are 
vegetables. If the alleged breach is just that you didn’t tend to the 
tomatoes, the jury should be asked to resolve the meaning.  But if it 
also includes disputes about the meaning of “tend” as to which the 
judge has not agreed there is useful EE, or the agreement is that you 
will tend “all the stuff in my backyard including the vegetables” and 
there is disagreement on what’s included in the “backyard,” the judge 
may well ask the jury for special findings and conclude the meaning 
analysis on her own.  Or perhaps the parties disagree whether 
contracted work was subject to one of many payment provisions in a 
contract, a determination of which is needed before other 
interpretation issues can be addressed, and which depends on a 
contested fact.  Then too the judge would ask the jury for special 
findings.269 
 
3.9.2.3 Special Findings in Connection With Verdict on Legal Claims 
and Legal Defenses 
 
As to (ii) above (findings on claims and defenses), we are 
assuming the jury has first decided a legal issue, and the judge will 
then decide an equitable issue, e.g. the jury decides an unjust 
enrichment claim and the judge is to decide in pari delicto.270 
One must be careful. The point here is, I suggest, only to make 
express what is implicit in the verdict, but not ask the jury to make 
 
 269. Dillingham-Ray Wilson v. City of L.A., 182 Cal. App. 4th 1396, 1405 (2010). 
 270. “In equal fault, equally culpable.”  BRYAN GARNER, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF 
LEGAL USAGE 460 (3d ed. 2011). 
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findings on facts not properly before them.  This is all in aid of 
ensuring the judge later clearly understands what the jury has 
decided, what binds the judge, as the judge proceeds to decide 
equitable issues. These special findings, perhaps in the form of special 
interrogatories, are meant to make express what may be implicit, but 
not to interfere with the subsequent judicial task any more than is 
necessary. 
An example might help. 
The judge has decided to have the evidence presented once, the 
jury to return a verdict on unjust enrichment, followed by a judicial 
determination of in pari delicto. What are the special findings to be 
sought from the jury? Perhaps none. If the jury can make all the 
factual findings it needs to decide the unjust enrichment issue 
without attending to whether the parties are equally at fault in, say, 
entering into the transaction, then the jury should do so, make no 
special findings, and so leave the judge free to decide the in pari delicto 
issue. But if the jury must decide, for some reason, something 
concerning the parties’ relative fault in entering into an illegal 
transaction, and a question entrusted to the jury depends on that 
finding, then special findings should be used to ensure the finding is 
expressly memorialized. The point is to ensure the judge does not 
make inconsistent findings. 
 
3.9.3 Staggering The Trial: A Worst-Case Scenario 
 
I will assume a worst-case scenario—although this is not too far-
fetched. We assume: 
• An integration issue: decided by the judge 
• EE conflict on a fact related to meaning: decided by the jury 
• Final meaning: decided by the judge 
• Contract claims, breach and damages: decided by jury 
• Fraud: decided by jury 
• Alter ego: decided by judge 
• In pari delicto defense: decided by judge 
• Accounting claim: decided by judge 
(We can make this even worse if we add a statute of frauds issue, 
arguably for the jury, and an issue that a party is equitably estopped 
from relying on the statute of frauds—which is for the court. But the 
point can be made without that.) 
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Some evidence of bad behavior is common to the in pari delicto 
defense, the fraud claim and alter ego; evidence is common to the 
fraud and contract claims, as well as to the accounting claim; perhaps 
some of the EE pertaining to the meaning of the contract also is 
relevant to the fraud claim. We might suppose some of the alter ego 
evidence, such as the use of company funds for personal use, is both 
irrelevant to the jury issues and prejudicial to an individual 
defendant; but some of the fraud evidence to be heard by the jury also 
relates to alter ego; and the same witnesses are needed for the fraud 
and alter ego allegations. Let’s say findings on accounting - 
depending on what they are - might be binding on the contract claims; 
and vice versa.  And findings on in pari delicto might determine the 
fraud claim; and vice versa. 
The conundrum cannot be solved without a careful review of 
which witnesses are needed for each piece of the trial, and what the 
testimony will be in each case.  The parties must provide claim-by-
claim and defense-by-defense witness lists, with short descriptions of 
the testimony (and whether it will be presented solely by deposition). 
The parties also should provide the judge with their views on the 
extent to which a decision on one issue must (to any extent) control 
the result on other issues to avoid inconsistency. For example, they 
should state, and if they disagree then brief, whether an element of 
the fraud claim (or an ultimate fact on which it relies) will decide the 
in pari delicto defense, or vice versa; or e.g., whether the decision on 
the accounting claim must decide some element of the contract claim 
(or an ultimate fact on which it relies); or vice versa. We might call 
this an issue dependency analysis.  The witness lists will help decide 
if a witness is needed for more than one issue and the cost (in time 
and witnesses testifying more than once) of phasing or bifurcation. 
The issue dependency analysis will help determine the order of 
decision-making. 
The parties should be asked to confer and propose an approach: 
they have the power of stipulation, which can do much to reduce 
complexity.  This is a good opportunity to see if stipulations can 
obviate the need for some witnesses; and perhaps to seek agreement 
on waiving a jury for at least some purposes after the parties 
contemplate the potential series of shifts of the trial from jury to judge 
and back again. The parties should confer and if they cannot agree, 
propose to the judge phases showing the total number of trial days 
required, when each step (scope, meaning, trial of issues etc.) will be 
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done, who will testify at each step, and identifying issue 
dependencies. 
Without agreement, the judge will have to impose. There are two 
core types of decisions: (1) when evidence is heard: jury’s evidence 
before judge’s evidence, vice versa, or simultaneously; (2) when 
decisions are made: judge before jury, or vice versa. The answers may 
be different for different sets of issues. 
In our hypothetical, given the major jury issues (e.g. contract and 
fraud) during which the background of the deal and the parties’ 
interactions will be discussed, the trial will likely predominate as a 
jury proceeding. There will be evidence unique to accounting and 
alter ego and so of interest only to the judge.  There are three options. 
(A) If there are no Ev. C. § 352 issues (it won’t waste too much of the 
jury’s time and it doesn’t risk confusing the jury), the evidence for the 
judge can simply come in during the jury trial, with an appropriate 
instruction to the jury to ignore it. (B) The jury can take (say) a half 
day off, and the judge can hear the accounting evidence then. (C) 
After the jury has returned a verdict, the judge hears the unique 
accounting and alter ego evidence; but this will inconvenience 
witnesses who also testified to the jury: the witness list should suffice 
to determine the amount of inconvenience involved. 
The real problem here is (2) above, the extent to which the jury’s 
decision could be affected by the judge’s decision, and vice versa.  
Under (A) and (B), the judge could actually decide the issue first, and 
perhaps issue a ruling that binds the jury (say, on the contract 
claim271); if (C) is used, the judge might be bound by a jury finding on 
contract.  Deciding the timing of decisions, I suggest may be a 
function of two considerations: (i) the practical: when exactly will the 
judge write up or issue her decision on accounting? Is there time for 
this while the jury is empaneled? If a statement of decision is 
required, how will that work, given the roughly 50-day timetable that 
could be required?272 Will the parties waive that timetable? And (ii) 
which fact finder has the better claim to predominance? Is this 
predominantly a contract claim, where the jury should be as free as 
possible to decide; or at heart an accounting case, where the judge 
should have as much flexibility as possible? This recommendation is 
a play off the “gist” approach (but not an example of it), and it’s 
 
 271. The fraud claim could also be impacted.  Cf., Union Bank v. Super. Ct., 31 Cal. 
App. 4th 573, 593 (1995). 
 272. Cal. Rules of Court 3.1590 ff. 
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interesting to note De Guere 273 in which the contract claim there was 
said to be, in effect, one for accounting. 
Most if not all of the evidence relevant to the in pari delicto 
defense is likely to be adduced during the jury trial, perhaps 
especially as the fraud case is presented.  Here again, the difficult 
issue may be (2) above, the timing of decision making.  Are there jury 
findings in connection with the fraud claim which are decisive with 
respect to in pari delicto?  If the judge finds for or against the in pari 
delicto defense, must that determine the outcome of the fraud case, or 
an element of it? If either of these is true, then the judge must direct 
the order of decisions, as outlined above. 
We still have to consider the postulated need for a jury to decide 
the credibility of EE. The problem with this is that until the parties are 
told what the contract means, they might have a difficult time 
preparing for the rest of the trial; in some cases, they may find it 
difficult to prepare the witnesses lists and what I have termed the 
issue dependency analysis. There may well be situations in which the 
jury can easily decide this issue, perhaps in a phased trial, with a 
decision on this followed by a brief hiatus before the rest of the trial 
starts. If not, and if the parties just won’t waive a jury for this purpose, 
judges might consider offering bifurcation and a separate mini-trial 
with a small jury, an expedited jury trial with 8 members, 6 votes 
needed for a verdict.  Jury selection is usually quick.274 This will be 
useful when the review of the EE will be brief, even if some of the 
evidence might also be presented to the next (main) jury.  While using 
two juries is a major cost, this approach may be worth the candle if, 
for example, the meaning problem is decisive, and its resolution 
could lead to settlement. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
“Step by step, the longest march . . .” 275 
 
The process of trying what appears to be a simple contract case 
is sometimes beset with time-consuming complexity, and multiple 
rounds of pretrial briefing, from the initial decision on determining 
 
 273. De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 56 Cal. App. 4th 482, 508 (1997). 
 274. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 630.01 ff; see Curtis E.A. Karnow, Expedited Jury Trials: 
Materials & Strategies (2019) (unpublished paper) (on file with Be Press). 
 275. Song popularized by Pete Seeger. 
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the burden of the parties in an Ev. C. § 405 hearing on integration 
through to the assessment whether a jury or the judge should make 
decisions first at trial. 
Few cases will involve every step outlined here.  But the lawyers 
generally will not have a good understanding of the pretrial 
considerations needed, and the judge will have to lead the discussion.  
Much of this work can be done pretrial in single assignment cases—
indeed, months in advance of trial.  But in master calendar courts 
where the judge gets the case on the day set for trial, the parties—and 
the court—may have to radically adjust their expectations on when 
the case will be ready for jury selection. 
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